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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
AND YOUTH MOVEMENTS IN THE POST -SOVIET SPHERE 
Christy Lynn Rhodes 
April 07, 2011 
In 1991, as democratic ideals spread through the former Soviet sphere, newly 
independent nations and satellite countries began engaging in the truly challenging, albeit 
hopeful task of dual state- and democracy-building endeavors. After twenty years of 
growth and change, democracy in the Commonwealth of Independent states remains 
tenuous. My research examines the levels of democracy in the region while assessing the 
electoral revolutions experienced there in the early 2000s. I employed a two-part 
approach, using aggregate-level data for a regional overview of democratic scores and a 
qualitative comparative case study evaluating the Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolutions as 
well as their influential youth movements. The findings reveal inconsistencies in the 
"success or failure" paradigm that has dominated scholarly research assessing electoral 
revolutions as well as democratization literature more broadly. 
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................... iii 
A CKN 0 WLEDG EMENTS ...................................................................................... iv 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................. v 
LIST OFT ABLES ................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER I: Introduction to Democratization in the Post-Soviet Sphere ......... 1 
Literature Review ...................................................................................................... 2 
Democratization and Democratic Transitions: "Waves" ....................................... 3 
Assumptions of the Transition Paradigm .............................................................. 6 
Color Revolutions ...................................................................................................... 9 
Success-versus-Failure ........................................................................................ 1 0 
CHAPTER II: Methodology- and Hypotheses ........................................................ 12 
Levell: Regional Focus .......................................................................................... 12 
Level 2: Case Study Focus (Georgia,Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan) .................................. 15 
Reconsidering Revolution and "Measuring" Success ............................ , ....... 18 
Research Questions and Hypotheses ........................................................................ 19 
CHAPTER III: Electoral Revolutions in the Great CIS Region .......................... 22 
Dependent Variable .................................................................................................. 22 
Independent Variables ............................................................................... : .............. 23 
Stateness ............................................................................................................... 24 
Political Participation .......................................................................................... 26 
Rule of Law ......................................................................................................... 29 
Stability of Democratic Institutions .................................................................... .31 
Political and Social Integration ......................................................................... .33 
Overview and Preliminary Conclusions .................................................................. .36 
CHAPTER IV: Color Revolutions: Oppositional Parties & State Apparatus .... 38 
Georgia's Rose Revolution (2003) ............................................................................ 38 
Ukraine's Orange Revolution (2004) ....................................................................... .43 
Kyrgyzstan's TuliplPink Revolution (2005) ............................................................. 47 
Summary ................................................................................................................... 50 
CHAPTER V: Youth Movements and Civil Society .............................................. 52 
Theoretical Frameworks ......................................................................................... 54 
VI 
Political Opportunity Theory ............................................................................... 55 
Diffusion and Modular Political Action .............................................................. 57 
Political Generations and post-Soviet youth ...................................................... .58 
Case Study Comparisons ........................................................................................ 61 
The Color Revolution's "Political Generation" .................................................. 62 
Kmara (Georgia) ................................................................................................. 73 
Pora! (Ukraine) .................................................................................................... 78 
KelKel (Kyrgyzstan) ............................................................................................ 81 
Summary and Civil Society Applications ............................................................... 84 
CHAPTER VI: Conclusion ...................................................................................... 86 
Methodological Limitations ..................................................................................... 86 
Areas of Future Study .............................................................................................. 87 
Summary and Overview .......................................................................................... 89 
REFEREN CES ......................................................................................................... 91 
APPENDIX A: Variables and Categorical Recoding for BTl Rankings ............. 98 
APPENDIX B: Logos for Youth Movements in the post-Soviet sphere ............ lOl 
APPENDIX C: Nonviolent Tactics from Albert Einstein Institute .................... 102 
CURRICULUM VITAE ......................................................................................... 106 
Vll 
LIST OF TABLES 
Chapter III PAGE 
Table 3.1 Electoral Revolutions in the CIS 23 
Table 3.2 BTl Stateness Rankings for CIS Countries 25 
Table 3.3 Electoral Revolution and Level of Stateness 26 
Table 3.4 BTl Political Participation Rankings 27 
for CIS Countries 
Table 3.5 Electoral Revolution and Level of Political 29 
Participation 
Table 3.6 BTl Rule of Law Rankings for CIS Countries 30 
Table 3.7 Electoral Revolution and Level of Rule of Law 31 
Table 3.8 BTl Stability of Democratic Institution Rankings 32 
Table 3.9 Electoral Revolution and Stability of Democratic 33 
Institutions Levels 
Table 3.10 BTl Political and Social Integration Rankings 34 
Table 3.11 Electoral Revolution and Political and Social 35 
Integration Levels 
Chapter VI 
Table 5.1 Georgia Tertiary Education Levels 64 
Table 5.2 Ukraine Tertiary Education Levels 65 
Table 5.3 Kyrgyzstan Tertiary Education Levels 65 
Table 5.4 Ethnic Make-up of Georgia 68 
Table 5.5 Ethnic Make-up of Ukraine 70 
Table 5.6 Ethnic Make-up of Kyrgyzstan 71 
Vlll 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIZATION AND 
TRANSITIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET SPHERE 
The question of how, when, and why states democratize has long been a central 
pillar of comparative politics and scholarly work within political science more generally. 
Early work focused on Southern Europe before moving westward to Latin America; 
however, democratization scholars have carved a lasting niche in political studies that has 
been unbounded by generation or region. In 1991, the next and seemingly most definitive 
stage of democratization came to fruition as the Soviet Union fell. As democratic ideals 
spread through the post-Soviet sphere, newly formed nations and satellite countries began 
engaging in the truly challenging, albeit hopeful task of dual state- and democracy-
building endeavors. 
While these changes were heralded as the ''third wave of democratization" 
(Huntington, 1993), many policymakers and scholars further embraced the paradigm 
within democratization literature that enumerated a simple, teleological transition to 
democracy. As the post-Soviet nations enter their second decade of "transitioning," 
however, this paradigm is up for debate and closer scrutiny. What was then pinpointed as 
a moment signifying "the end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992), has since encountered 
challenges, wide variations of success, and significant reversals while democratic ideals 
languish throughout this post-Soviet space. 
This has certainly been the case in the more immediate events of the past ten 
1 
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years, which seem to mark a second definitive stage of this so-called "wave." Electoral 
protests, deemed the "Color Revolutions," spread through the region as attempts by 
citizens and oppositional parties to change the authoritarian or corrupt natures of these 
relatively new governments. Though heralded as major advancements in democratic 
change by regional proponents, media outlets and Western academics, the effectiveness 
and long-term changes are questionable throughout the changing regimes. 
The literature review that follows is structured in such a way to reflect upon the 
development and present-state of democratization scholarship, including the so-called 
"transition" paradigm. Since the movements in question concentrated on the ballot to 
improve democracy, I have also included a section discussing the ways in which elections 
are often wrongly conflated to mean democracy, without taking into account other, 
relevant characteristics. The last section will briefly discuss the literature surrounding the 
Color Revolutions themselves, before beginning the detailed comparative study of the 
three specific cases: the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, . . 
and the Tulip/Pink Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: DEMOCRATIZATION AND TRANSITIONS 
An analysis of democratization literature and the transition paradigm would be 
quite incomplete without an introduction to Samuel Huntington and his now somewhat 
infamous "wave" terminology to describe the phenomenon. Though I have already 
mentioned critiques to this view of democracy, it is nonetheless important for a 
background understanding and absolutely essential within the wider democratization 
literature. 
It is clear why democratization and democracy-building literature has flourished 
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within contemporary comparative politics. One simple reason is the sheer growth in 
"cases" to study. Between 1974 and 1990, more than 30 democracies emerged, thus 
doubling the number of democratic governments in the world (Huntington, 1993: 12). 
Though other democratic "waves" and reversals have occurred throughout history, 
Huntington's "third wave" work is notable, as it comes at the end of the Cold War, when 
the United States and democracy emerged as the victor. This was a critical juncture in 
history, and he argues that this "victory" led to a rapid spread of democracy and the 
accompanying need to address these new countries and how they democratize 
(Huntington, 1993: 13). 
Although he accounts for varying stages of success, Huntington describes 
democratic transitions as linear and teleological paths with a certain end: a full-fledged 
democratic system. The transitions to or away from democracy are the only options in his 
wave analogy. Some may stall and result in "democracy with adjectives" (Collier and 
Levitsky, 1997), but the prevailing views paint a polarized picture of democracy or non-
democracy. Presently, however, many of the post-Soviet states Huntington writes about in 
the Third Wave are still in ''transition'' or experiencing failed democratic revolutions. 
Similarly, others have benefitted from economic growth but have not necessarily 
experienced the concomitant democratic change he initially prescribed. 
His methods of analysis, or the insular "waves" of democratization, present an 
even narrower, consolidated view. It results in generalizations, which are broadly applied 
to the countries undergoing change at one time. It does not fully take into account 
histories or experiences that may influence democratic gains or losses in a particular 
location. This top-down approach views the waves as monolithic global change and 
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ignores complexities happening within countries. When addressing internal dynamics, he 
proposes broad factors leading to change, which may not be applicable to the country in 
question. 
Overall, Huntington sacrifices detail for generalizability and presents a too-thin 
and problematic account of the "third wave" in democratic growth. By viewing many of 
these changes as simply transitional phases on the path to democracy, he misses a chance 
for deeper analysis. This problem raises critical questions about views of democratization 
studies and the existing literature's transition paradigm. 
I have faulted Huntington for an inaccurate view of democratization and its path 
of development, but he by no means stands alone in this view. Instead, his work and 
much of that which dominates scholarly work on democratization is built upon this faulty 
paradigm of "waves" and a certain "end of history" path to democracy. 
Thomas Carothers (2002) in the Journal of Democracy arguably presents the most 
compelling criticism of the transition paradigm and a call for its reassessment among 
comparative political scientists. The concept of the third wave was embraced by many 
scholars and dually loved by policymakers alike, yet its basic premises have proven 
inaccurate or incomplete in describing democratic change. Moreover, while it was 
perhaps useful during a "time of momentous and often surprising political upheaval," it 
can no longer describe the day-to-day or decade-to-decade realities for the countries it 
aims to assess (Carothers, 2002: 6). Succinctly summed up by Carothers, then, "it is 
increasingly clear that reality is no longer conforming to the model" (2002: 6). Though 
this is applicable to many nations undergoing democracy-building efforts, it is perhaps 
most clearly seen in the post-Soviet sphere. 
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When nations do not proceed along a smooth path to transition or worse, return to 
authoritative policies and procedures, the current standard in democratization literature is 
to label them as a democratic subtype. For the majority of these nations, which exist in a 
gray zone between fully functioning democracy and authoritative regime, they are simply 
regarded as still in "transition." The question rarely arises that the transition might not 
result in a democracy. Once again, Carothers is enlightening in his assessment of the 
troubled paradigm: "By describing countries in the gray zone as types of democracies, 
analysts are in effect trying to apply the transition paradigm to the very countries whose 
political evolution is calling that paradigm into question" (2002: 10). Rather than 
sharpening the definition of democracy, there exists a theme in the literature to create 
"diminished" subtypes (Sartori, 1970, 1984; Collier & Levitsky, 1997). 
Though the phenomenon of subtypes is not necessarily new in democratization 
literature, Collier and Levitsky (1997) put forth an empirical study that challenged its 
usefulness and proliferation throughout the studies. They argue that the "hundreds" of 
democracy subtypes or "democracy with adjectives" presents a dangerous challenge to 
the literature. This tendency creates messy and blurred distinctions, often with little 
overlap or considerations of those that already exist. In other words, if a case does not fit 
the model, it has been more likely that a scholar will create a new subtype, rather than 
concentrating on the distinct and compelling history of this example and how it 
challenges the definitional paradigms. 
The continuation of the transition paradigm and the additional adoption of 
diminished democracy subtypes have led to a false simplicity and a real inaccuracy in 
democratization studies. This habit among scholars has, furthermore "impose [ d] a 
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simplistic and often incorrect conceptual order on an empirical tableau of considerable 
complexity" (Carothers, 2002: 15). It is no longer accurate to assume the stages and 
rules, which have characterized this paradigm and indeed, its subsequent plethora of 
scholarly studies since before Huntington's "third wave" after the Cold War. 
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE TRANSITION PARADIGM 
Thomas Carothers (2002) argues for a clean and decisive break from the transition 
paradigm, and in doing so, he is very clear about which exact stages and prescriptive 
elements of the democratization literature should be thrown out. Though they may be 
applicable at times, it is dangerous for the following considerations to be automatically 
"assumed" anytime a state undergoes democratic change. 
Away from Authoritarianism: First, it should no longer be assumed that either the 
countries in the "third wave" or future democratizing nations are actually in transition to 
democracy. An assumption that pervades the democratization literature is that if a country 
is moving away from authoritarianism, then it is on an almost automatic path toward 
democracy. Before critiques from the likes of Carothers, Levitsky and Collier, this step 
was often the first and most concrete pillar of democratization studies. Nonetheless, 
empirical analyses and observations reveal that this is not necessarily true. A state may 
become less authoritarian in some ways but never have any intention of becoming a full-
fledged democracy as prescribed by many scholars and policymakers within the 
democracy-promotion communities. 
Defined Stages: Next, it should no longer be assumed that states will follow the 
straightforward and teleological stages as follows: democratic opening, breakthrough and 
consolidation. Most often, states have not fallen in line with these stages. Instead, they 
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have languished in the aforementioned gray area, or a "precarious middle ground" 
between functioning democracies and outright dictatorships, despite efforts that would be 
simply characterized as "openings" or "breakthroughs" (Carothers, 2002: 18). Though 
this subject will be addressed in much greater detail, the example of Georgia in its early 
stages of independence after the Soviet Union and the democratic promise it held in 1991 
stands out as an exemplary illustration of this problem. In 1991, Georgians and 
democratic promoters - both scholarly and policy-oriented - had high hopes for the 
newly independent state. In 2002, Carothers cited this as an example where the transition 
paradigm fails. At the time of his article, Georgia was on the brink of state failure, unable 
to balance the dual challenges of state-building and democracy-building. Even more 
interestingly, for the purposes' of this work, is that now Georgia has fully undergone a 
"democratic revolution" in which its old regime was ousted yet, it remains mired in 
conflicts and a resurgence of authoritative ruling powers, as will be described in detail in 
the next section. 
Concentration on Elections: One of the reasons offered for why the transition 
paradigm has not been able to account for democratic change and furthermore, has not 
been able to fulfill its "consolidation" stage is that the concentration on elections is too 
extreme and narrow-minded (Carothers, 2002; Moller and Skaaning, 2010). Though 
political rights, such as speech and assembly, have been considered in the literature 
(Dahl, 1989), the so-called "electoral core" of democratization remains firmly intact. 
This Schumpeterian understanding of democracy places undue emphasis on the 
presence and functioning of elections, to the detriment of other important factors 
(Schumpter, 1974; Moller and Skaaning, 2010). A third demand for democracy, other 
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than elections and political rights, emerged later in scholarly work and may be 
characterized as the rule oflaw (O'Donnell, 2001, 2004). This is accomplished and 
achieved by a legal system that embraces and then ensures the rights and obligations of a 
democratic system. Still, despite these other two areas, a concentration on elections is 
more pervasive and commonly used in democratization analyses. More importantly, 
perhaps, is the notion that even though elections are spreading and in use in many 
nations, states do not necessarily embrace the other two attributes of democracy (Moller 
and Skaaning, 2010: 276). Again, for the purposes of analyzing the Color Revolutions, 
this notion is important to keep in mind as the citizens rallied around in support of 
electoral changes, or in circumstances relating to corruption in the voting system. As the 
elected terms tum over or come to an end, it is arguable that the fervor of democratic 
ideals has not been rooted within the system overall. This supports the notions embraced 
by Carothers, Moller and Skaaning (2010) who argue that elections alone reveal a very 
"thin" description of democracy. Many countries can operate with elections, even those 
that are seemingly free and fair, but without further embracing democratic rights for their 
citizens. In short, elections are an easy path to a democracy "victory," but as scholars 
critically evaluate the transition paradigm, it is apparent that the sole and simple presence 
of elections does not a democracy make. 
Political Elites and Secondary State-Building: Finally, there is a tendency within 
democratization literature to assess only the roles of political elites in the democracy-
building process. Within this area, it is also argued that state-building comes secondary to 
democracy-building. The challenges of these prescriptions from the transition paradigm 
are once again echoed by the experiences in Georgia from 1991 to present. 
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Considering these challenges and the need to work outside a traditional, transition 
paradigm, Carothers is once again insightful in suggesting a new approach for 
democratization studies and empirical work. For states that are languishing in that 
precarious middle ground, he suggests that democratization studies "proceed from a 
penetrating analysis of the particular core syndrome that defines the political life in the 
country in question, and how aid interventions can change that syndrome" (2002: 19). 
Two decades after their seemingly defining moment, the post-Soviet space of Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia present an ideal place to approach democratization in this more 
nuanced, penetrating analysis. 
COLOR REVOLUTIONS 
The period after the fall of the Soviet Union has been characterized by democratic 
changes, reversals and complexity for the former USSR territories or satellite states. 
These nations faced the unique and unenviable task of simultaneously building a state, an 
economy and institutions. As scholars and policymakers in the West and within this 
region were hopeful for a swift and dramatic democratic transition, the reality has been 
much more complex. After the dust settled following the dramatic changes of the early 
1990s, these relatively new democracies have more recently had to struggle with the 
consolidation of democratic ideals and the fair turnover of powers, many of which were 
accustomed to the Soviet-style rule of power. One of the more recent manifestations of 
these challenges have come in the form of electoral uprisings, or "revolutions" in the 
region. 
Starting in 2000, the Yugoslav Revolution, or the "Bulldozer Revolution," marked 
the first in the next generation of eastern European democratic changes following the 
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immediate post-Cold War era (Spirova, 2008). This event spurred a series of similar, non-
violent protests in neighboring post-Soviet states, beginning with the Rose Revolution in 
Georgia in 2003, Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004, and the Tulip or Pink Revolution 
in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Though the extent and effects of regional diffusion are debated 
(Way, 2008), these revolutions, commonly grouped together as the "Color Revolutions" 
share a great deal of characteristics. 
Despite these shared elements, however, much of the literature on the Color 
Revolutions tends to be single case-studies or large-N comparisons of global, democratic 
revolutions. My choice to adopt a qualitative case-centered comparison was taken to 
learn more about these shared characteristics, as well as how the cases are nuanced. It is 
notable, too, that much of the discussion has been highly-electorally driven analyses, with 
less focus on historical factors that may explain variation. Given the emphasis on 
elections within democratization literature and the transition paradigm, this theme is not 
at all surprising, but it does stand to be expanded upon. 
In particular, the literature that attempts to provide a smaller-N and detailed 
comparative analysis of the Color Revolutions, such as Wolchik and Bunce (2006) and 
Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009), has centered largely on elite politics and national-level 
events while indirectly but effectively downplaying the roles of less obvious actors: 
opposition party influences, coercive elements by both the state and protestors, and the 
extent of involvement among civic and nongovernmental interest groups, including the 
size, support and demographics of actively protesting segments in the given societies. 
In these decisions to concentrate on elites and national level politics, the original 
impetus behind the revolutions may be ignored and contribute to the unsustainability of 
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democratic reform. The comparative case study that follows, on the other hand, is 
informed by the actors and events that have been obfuscated during previous analyses. 
11 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
Since democratization efforts within this region are an area of study that deals 
with rapid change in the form of frequent elections and new developments in civic culture 
and policies, it is one that requires constant study. In order to evaluate democratization in 
the post-Soviet sphere, with an emphasis on the Color Revolutions, I will employ a 
comparative study that will be conducted in two parts. The first stage will evaluate all 
former Soviet republic states at an aggregate level using BTl (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Transformation Index) scores. The second will be a more qualitative, case-centered 
comparison of the three aforementioned and similar Color Revolutions: Georgia's Rose 
Revolution, Ukraine's Orange Revolution, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. All 
three were largely non-violent protests calling for free, fair elections and an end to post-
Soviet authoritarianism following the state's normal and prescribed election cycle. 
DESIGN AND SOURCES OF DATA - REGIONAL FOCUS 
A defining feature of this research is the two levels of analysis. This two-part 
approach was chosen to increase sample size and provide for greater generalizability and 
thus, more reliable findings about levels of democracy within this region. In both 
comparative stages, the main unit of analysis is nation-states. The major difference 
between the stages relies upon the sources of data: aggregate index scores for the first and 
detailed, specific findings for the specific Color Revolution states in the second. 
F or the first phase of research, I will consult aggregate data for the post-Soviet 
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republics, also known as CIS, or the Commonwealth of Independent States, based on 
variables related to democracy and leadership management. Since it is impossible to go to 
into adequate detail for every CIS-based country for the purposes of this project, I hope 
that this aggregate view will help cast a wider net in answering the questions driving my 
research. While several databases and sources are available and attempt to enumerate the 
levels of democracy in a given location, I have chosen the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Transformation Index (henceforth, BTl) for my research. After careful consideration and 
evaluations of similar projects, such as Freedom House scores and variables within the 
World Values Survey (lnglehart-Welzel, 2010), BTl has proven to be the most reliable 
and applicable resource. 
Unlike the aforementioned research, BTl's focus falls directly in line with the 
purpose of my own research interests. Rather than empirically evaluating a large set of 
variables, this index and the researchers responsible for it are inspired by and aim to 
"represent the world in transformation" (BTl, 2010). As such, the work is clearly inspired 
by scholarly work and theories found within democratization literature as it attempts an 
empirical understanding of the democratization process. Furthermore, the index aims to 
understand countries in transformation and as such, narrows its focus by limiting the 
dataset to include countries that have yet to achieve a fully consolidated democracy or 
market economy, and additionally, have populations of more than two million (BTl, 
2010). This narrower focus, along with the index's regional search capabilities, allow for 
a more detailed understanding, even within the aggregate view. As such, this index and its 
useful Transformation Atlas is the most applicable and informative measure of 
democracy for the first stage of my research. 
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Thus far, I have shown how the research focus of BTl complements my own; 
however, it is additionally important to note that the data can be extrapolated to shed light 
on the particular regional focus of this work. The flexibility of BTl is important so that it 
will allow for an aggregate understanding of the region in question, thereby giving a 
baseline understanding of recent democratic changes, challenges and obstacles in the 
post-Soviet sphere. This greater understanding is possible because of how BTl structures 
its data. First, it provides individual rankings on a country. These rankings are based on 
dimensions of democracy, its market economy, and "political management" (BTl, 2010). 
Based on 17 criteria, the democratically-transforming countries are then scored and 
ranked among their worldwide peers. 
Secondly, BTl's data are structured so that a researcher can narrow down specific 
rankings in the form of country reports. These reports evaluate a given country's political 
and economic performance, as well as the political leadership or management (BTl, 
2010). Therefore, even though we are working within the large-N, aggregate view of 
democratic changes in this stage of my research, the source of data allows for greater 
nuance in country-by-country comparisons. This additional function will yield a 
smoother transition between aggregate comparisons and the case-specific descriptions in 
the second level of analysis. Most importantly, however, is that the BTl biennial rankings 
will allow one to compare and contrast changes between countries or over a given time 
period and look for similarities, variability and other factors to explain the democratic 
changes among the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
It should be noted, however, that a possible perceived shortcoming of the BTl is 
that it only covers a somewhat recent span of time. Although its relative infancy may be 
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The method of evaluation for the second and more extensive section of my 
research will draw upon case comparisons of three Color Revolutions and their 
aftermaths in the post-Soviet sphere. Additionally, path-dependent historical strategies 
will be employed to allow for more nuance in analyzing the three events. In asserting that 
"history matters," this analytical approach will evaluate the instances of change and 
continuity as they relate to the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyzstani cases. It is also 
important to note that the purpose in this wider approach is to evaluate and stress the 
roles of otherwise obfuscated actors, such civic movements and less elite-controlled 
activities, that seem to be highly influential and active in all three cases. 
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The choice in adopting a qualitative case-centered comparison. that is also 
informed by a historical analysis is to move the discussion from the highly electorally-
driven analyses or aggregated, large-N variables. The following research is informed by 
social movement theory, including discussions on the most effective definitions of 
"revolution" itself, academic journal articles on the events, and for more recent changes 
and to develop an understanding of how the revolutions have been portrayed, I will 
consider media coverage of the Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyzstani changes. 
The selection of three seemingly similar cases also stems from the need for an 
overall, qualitative assessment of these events. In other words, though they are 
quantitatively labeled as the same and noted as successes in recent scholarly work, they 
are likely to possess important and qualifying differences that are in need of recognition 
(Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009). Furthermore, in attempting to challenge the quick and 
arguably inaccurate assessments by scholars who rush to label an event as a "success" or 
"failure," the tendency is to pull in as many democratic transitions or "revolutions" as 
possible in order to compare them side by side. The three cases chosen cover the 
continuum of perceived "success" and "failure" and account for geographic variation 
within this area of focus. Spanning from the westernmost edge to Central Asia, the 
countries that will be discussed reflect the diverse nature of the transforming former 
Soviet region. 
In particular, the recent 2009 article by Kalandadze and Orenstein adopts this 
approach to the detriment of a detailed, robust analysis for the countries included. They, 
instead, rely upon aggregated data already gathered and coded to assess the democratic 
levels of given states before and after the onset of a democratic or electoral revolution. 
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They cite Freedom House's Freedom in the World series for "general assessments of 
regime dynamics" and supplement those findings with Freedom House's Nation's in 
Transit publications to assist with a closer look at the complex political regimes 
(Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009: 1406). The authors cull 12 states that have undergone 
recent democratic change and to their benefit, they do attempt to account for various 
regions in looking to reach greater generalizability. It is their end-goal that is problematic, 
since their findings are summarized into a table with three possible outcomes, which 
upon reading, seems to erase altogether the unique details for a state. Factors that may be 
important to the overall understanding of a given country's authoritative past and present-
day foundations of democratic progress are sacrificed in place of a neatly summarized 
label. That is why, in this research, I have employed a two-pronged analysis. It is 
essential to have a broader, empirical understanding of democratizing countries while 
also addressing specifics that are not easily measured in a quantitative analysis. 
Kalandadze and Orenstein's work is, in of itself, interesting and supplies 
information about a wide variety of relatively new democratizing changes. However, 
their findings are summarized into a table with only three possible outcomes, thus losing 
a great deal of nuance in the process. Their classifications include the following for a 
"democratization score": (1) Failed/Repressed cases, (2) Successful cases without 
democratization, and (3) Successful cases with democratization (or some 
democratization). Putting aside the fact that they never fully define what they mean by 
democratization, one already may be suspicious that democratic electoral revolutions 
may not have a clear end that can be so easily defined as a success or failure. 
Furthermore, in looking only to national elections and failing to account for the changes 
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in attitudes by citizens themselves, the scholars ignore a great deal of important 
endogenous and exogenous influences on democratization as a whole. 
Reconsidered Revolution and "Measuring" Success 
The assessments of the democracy in the post-Soviet spaces of Eastern Europe 
and parts of Central Asia have revealed notable inconsistencies in how "revolution" is 
treated in present-day politics. As in the enterprise of the Color Revolutions, it appears 
that the Western media label these actions as revolutions shortly before bracketing the 
actions as full or partial successes or failures. Additionally, some scholars have even gone 
as far to label them as less than "real revolutions" or ones that simply did not "effect 
long-term change" (Stewart, 2009, p. 645, 647). These same scholars seem to only be 
looking to elite-driven or national electoral processes to drive their assessments. 
Specialists in the region, such as McFaul (2007), Bunce and Wolchik (2006), have 
limited their language in regard to the Color Revolutions and propose a definitional 
change in the resulting new paradigm of "electoral revolution." In one article, the author 
even went through the great painstaking detail of putting every occurrence of the word 
revolution in quotation marks, as to suggest the failures every single time the events were 
even mentioned (Stewart, 2009). While it is true that post-Soviet nations, including 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan may have experienced changes following their Color 
Revolutions to indicate that democracy did not fully "arrive," this aforementioned 
scholarship on the work downplays even the most basic, albeit meaningful, result of these 
events: that citizens and oppositional parties organized within authoritative environments 
for democratic ideals. 
In an effort to look beyond these stringent notions of revolution and fully assess 
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the capabilities as well as limitations of the three movements, the sections below will 
attempt detailed, comparative case analyses. The purpose here is to look away from 
national elections, approval ratings, and presidential outcomes in order to reassess the 
changing developments and characteristics that made the events possible, while also 
assessing any long-term influences in the broader civil society. I will begin with an 
overview for each country to describe the basic facts of each case, before comparing all 
three on the following characteristics: opposition party influences, coercive elements by 
the state apparatus - through military or police involvement, and the extent of 
involvement of youth movements, an important and understudied component of the post-
Soviet electoral revolutions. 
Though the case selection discussion dealt generally with the events and 
similarities, the purpose of this section is to expand upon the similarities to look for 
intrinsic characteristics that may challenge the dichotomous success versus failure 
paradigm employed by Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009). Furthermore, it would appear 
that the definitional and limiting changes to the word revolution may be too rash and 
employ only a narrow understanding of these events. In drawing upon scholarly work by 
Charles Fairbanks (2007) in Revolution Reconsidered, the following section attempts to 
illustrate a more nuanced approach before scholars, politicians and the media 
wholeheartedly brush off these events as failures in a democratic "wave." The countries 
will be analyzed below, via the earlier proposed qualitative case-centered comparison. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This research aims to test two hypotheses about democratization and democratic 
revolution within the post-Soviet sphere. The first addresses electoral revolutions in the 
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regional more broadly, while the second theorizes on the employment of the "success or 
failure" paradigm within the larger transition literature. 
Initially, the first hypothesis assesses electoral revolutions with a comparison of 
democratic transition indicators in the CIS region and is found in my first and aggregate 
level oftesearch. Hypothesis #1: when a CIS country has experienced an electoral 
revolution, it is more likely it will have higher levels democracy. Electoral revolutions in 
the post-Soviet sphere have been carried out as attempts to move closer to ideal 
democracies. This aggregated research will allow for a baseline understanding of the 
region and assess the following indicators of democracy: stateness, political 
participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and political and social 
integration. 
The second level of analysis focuses on a singular factor that may influence the 
longevity of the democratic changes. Hypothesis #2: When a country has a higher level of 
civic involvement, it is more likely it will have lasting reform following an electoral 
revolution. While this is not a new assertion within democratization literature by any 
means, I hope that this will be a more effective way to evaluate the way non-elite forces 
influence politics within a transitional democracy. The role of these otherwise outsider 
groups, in this case, the level of youth movement involvement, will be utilized to assess 
the longevity of reforms and impacts on the wider societies. 
The driving forces behind these hypotheses are inextricable and critical to both 
democracy and studies of the Color Revolutions in the CIS region. As such, they were 
chosen so that they can provide powerful and parsimonious analyses for the region in 
question as well as its present-day democratization efforts. Additionally, both hypotheses 
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address the faulty theoretical paradigm that has been previously discussed in the literature 
review. These findings assess how views change when we remove democratic 
revolutions (and indeed, transitions overall) from a two-pronged scrutiny of success or 
failure. Based on preliminary research, it seems that when the changes are characterized 
as "success" or "failures," it creates a false dichotomy that inevitably erases important 
distinctions or results in irreducible and inaccurate claims. This is evaluated in Chapter 4, 
with variables related to oppositional leadership and state influences (such as the military 
or police involvement in the electoral revolutions) and in Chapter 5, which evaluates the 
youth movements. This broader challenge proposed here questions the early outcomes, as 




ELECTORAL REVOLUTIONS IN THE GREATER CIS REGION 
The purpose of this chapter is to use a broader, regional approach to assess 
electoral revolutions in the CIS. Using the BTl rankings, it is possible to empirically 
account for recent democratic change in the CIS region and begin analyzing the impact 
the Color Revolutions may have had in the area. Using democratic indicators from BTl 
'and by coding the CIS countries according to their experiences with electoral revolutions, 
my research will benefit from a baseline understanding of these movements in the region 
and their impact on democratization efforts overall. The hypothesis driving this stage of 
research is: when a CIS country has experienced an electoral revolution, it is more likely 
it will have higher levels of democracyl. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable here is the presence of electoral revolution within the CIS 
nation-states since the fall of the Soviet Union. This variable has been coded based on a 
commonly accepted definition of "electoral revolution" present within Color Revolution 
literature (McFaul, 2006; Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009). The twelve countries2 were 
dichotomously coded as a 0 to reflect no presence or I to indicate the presence of an 
electoral revolution. At this stage of analysis, the 0 or 1 does not suggest the longevity or 
2 
Characteristics are according to the BTl rankings. These are detailed in the Independent 
Variable section below. 
The countries included are: Annenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. It should be noted that, 
as of August 2009, Georgia withdrew its membership from CIS. For the purposes of this 
research, it is still included in the regional analysis. 
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impact of these uprisings, but simply follows McFaul and others' precise definitions to 
signify a presence. The countries are coded according to the following criteria: 
1. A fraudulent election acts as the driving force for electoral protests; 
2. The opposition resorts to extra-constitutional means to defend democracy 
(i.e. mass protests); 
3. Both the incumbents and the oppositional candidates declare their 
authority, due to the disputed electoral results (McFaul, 2006). 
McFaul also suggests a fourth criterion: that both sides avoid significant use of violence. 
More recently, however, scholars have questioned this last claim, arguing that reports of 
violence may stem from incumbent party controls and, as such, are not a clear indicator 
or measurement for electoral revolutions. Additionally, "failed" revolutions are often 
squashed by violent means, but these actions should not draw attention away from the 
fact that citizens acted in mass protests to support free and fair elections in a struggling 
democracy (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2010). 
Table 3.1 Electoral Revolutions in the CIS 
Electoral Revolutions Present (1) No Occurrences (0) 
Armenia (1996, 2000) Kazakhstan . 
Azerbaijan (2000, 2003, 2005) Russia 
Belarus (2001, 2004, 2005) Tajikistan 
Georgia (2003) Turkmenistan 
Kyrgyzstan (2005) Uzbekistan 
Moldova (2009) 
Ukraine (2004) 
Source: Kalandadze, K., & Orenstein, M. A. (2009). Electoral protests and 
democratization beyond the Color Revolutions. Comparative Political Studies, 42(11), 
1403-1425. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The independent variables for this aggregate level of analysis stem from data 
collection in the BTl democratic rankings. These five criteria are based on a total of 18 
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questions used in assessing the state of political transfonnation and include: stateness, 
political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic institutions, and political and 
social integration. In contrast to other, more narrow definitions of democracy that focus 
primarily on basic civil rights and free elections, the BTl's concept of democracy casts a 
wider net to include the above-mentioned details that are essential, but often sacrificed in 
other statistical analyses. 
The BTl thus asks to what extent the democratic system is consolidated in tenns 
of its acceptance, its structures of representation and its political culture. In so doing, the 
BTl shows whether, and to what extent, the ground rules for democracy are anchored in a 
society. For the purposes of this section, I will isolate the five overarching criteria. The 
overall scores for each of the five characteristics are scored 1.0 to 10.0 on BTL For the 
purposes of this research, they have been recoded into the following four categories: Very 
Strong, Strong, Weak and Very Weak. These categories are based on the relative scores of 
the CIS region's rankings to allow for a more accurate assessment between countries.3 
Additionally, these narrower and descriptive categories should provide for an easier 
understanding of the five, following variables. 
Stateness 
The aggregated score given to a country's "stateness" is based on four more 
defined elements in the effort to improve content validity for this important characteristic 
of democracy. The BTl Program and coding manual defines "stateness" as having 
obtained this clear objective: "there is clarity about the nation's existence as a state, with 
adequately established and differentiated power structures" (2010, 17). Though this 
3 For a full description of the categories and how they have been recoded for the crosstabulations, please 
see Appendix A. 
24 
research utilizes the aggregated scores, it is nonetheless important to enumerate the four 
questions that go into determining this overall score. It is clear that this Index and 
scholars working on the project approached this carefully, as to adequately reflect the 
characteristics which may determine a region's stateness and ability to rule. 
1. To what extent does the state s monopoly on the use offorce cover the territory? 
2. To what extent do all relevant groups in society agree about citizenship and 
accept the nation-state as legitimate? 
3. To what extent are the state s legitimacy and its legal order defined without 
interference by religious dogmas? 
4. To what extent do basic administrative structures exist?(Source: BTl 2010, 17). 
Table 3.2 BTl Stateness Rankings for CIS Countries (2006-2010) 
Stateness by Country 2006 2008 2010 
Armenia 8.8 8.8 8.8 
Azerbaijan 6.8 6.8 7.0 
Belarus 8.3 8.5 9.0 
Georgia 5.3 6.8 6.3 
Kazakhstan 8.5 8.5 8.5 
Kyrgyzstan 7.3 8.0 8.3 
Moldova 6.5 8.0 8.0 
Russia 7.5 8.0 8.0 
Tajikistan 5.8 6.8 7.3 
Turkmenistan 7.3 7.8 7.8 
Ukraine 8.0 8.8 8.8 
Uzbekistan 6.8 7.3 7.3 
Source: BTl Transformation Index 2006-2010 
The table above reflects the range in variability for the CIS and its stateness 
scores. Belarus, with its strong state apparatus and monopoly on force, is the region's 
highest scorer at 9.0, with Georgia having the regional low in 2006. Additionally, all of 
the CIS have experienced an increase in their stateness scores, with the lone exception of 
Georgia. This is unsurprising given the nation's recent skirmishes with Russia and inter-
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ethnic and territorial afflictions. As such, the nation has not been able to hold onto the 
monopoly of force or accepted legitimacy, as the indices suggest. 
Table 3.3 Electoral Revolution * Level of Stateness Crosstabulation 




Weak Strong Total 
Electoral No (0) 0 3 2 0 5 
Revolution? Yes (1) 1 1 4 1 7 
Total 1 4 6 1 12 
Source: BTl Transformation Index 2010 
To additionally evaluate stateness of the CIS, table 3.3 is a cross-tabulation of the 
presence of electoral revolutions and the levels of stateness. I tested the claim that when a 
CIS country has experienced an electoral reform, it is more likely it will have higher 
levels of democracy by way of the stateness cross-tabulation. The table above shows a 
positive, but weak relationship between presence of electoral revolution and stateness. 
When evaluating correlation, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient also shows a weak 
relationship (r=.l55, 2-tailed sig. =.630t These findings support my overall claim but 
the 'weak relationship requires further evaluation. As such, detailed variables related to 
stateness, such as the coercive apparatus of the state will be evaluated in a comparative 
case study in the next chapter. 
Political Participation 
The second independent variable that serves as a proxy in understanding 
democratization for the CIS countries is political participation. Clearly, since this 
research aims to assess the impact of electoral revolutions, the continuance or change of a 
4 The correlations were calculated using the unranked (0-10) dataset from the 2010 Transformation Indices. 
26 
citizenry's political participation is a strong indicator of satisfaction and overall 
democratic development following changes in voting or the electoral system. The 
description of political participation from BTl echoes these sentiments. The project 
defines this variable as: "the populace determines who rules, and it has other political 
freedoms" (2010, 17). 
Like stateness, this research uses the aggregated scores for political participation, 
but it is still important to note the underlying questions that make up these values. 
1. To what extent are rulers determined by general, free andfair elections? 
2. To what extent do democratically elected leaders have the effective power to 
govern, or to what extent are there veto powers and political enclaves? 
3. To what extent can independent political and/or civic groups assemble freely? 
4. To what extent can citizens, organizations and media express opinions freely? 
(BTl 2010, 17). 
Table 3.4 BTl Political Participation Rankings for CIS Countries (2006-2010) 
2006 2008 2010 
Countr Armenia 6.0 5.3 4.0 
y Azerbaijan 3.0 3.0 3.3 
Belarus 3.0 2.5 2.8 
Georgia 7.5 8.5 7.3 
Kazakhstan 2.8 3.3 3.3 
Kyrgyzstan 3.8 6.8 3.5 
Moldova 6.8 7.5 6.5 
Russia 6.0 5.0 5.3 
Tajikistan 2.8 3.0 3.0 
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.3 1.3 
Ukraine 7.8 7.8 7.8 
Uzbekistan 1.8 2.3 2.0 
Source: BTl Transformation Index 2006-2010 
Since BTl's questions for political participation ties directly into the ability for 
citizens to engage in free and fair elections, it is logical that this region would express a 
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wide variety of scores, given that fraudulent or corrupt electoral practices have long been 
considered a nonn and an impetus for change in the Color Revolutions. 
At a steady 7.8 out of 10.0 for each year evaluated, the political participation 
levels for Ukraine set this nation as the regional leader for pro-democratic refonn. As 
mentioned earlier, however, the other 11 nation-states reveal a great amount of 
variability, and even unpredictability. Overall, seven countries encountered decreasing 
levels over the years consulted, while five expressed an upward or stable pattern in their 
scores. 
Next, Table 3.5 compares the 2010 levels of political participation, with instances 
of electoral revolutions as earlier defined. As with stateness, the purpose for this cross-
tabulation is to reflect upon the earlier hypothesis: When a country has experienced an 
electoral revolution, it is more likely it will have higher levels of democracy. However, 
the results of the below cross-tabulation do not indicate a strong pattern. The only "very 
weak" country was one that did not experience an electoral revolution, while the three 
"very strong" ones had all experienced one .. When evaluating correlation, the Pearson 
Correlation Coefficient also shows a somewhat stronger relationship (r=.S07, 2-tailed sig. 
=.092). Most countries, however, are clustered in the ambiguous middle-ground between 
weak and strong. This finding does not strongly support the claim that a country that has 
experienced an electoral revolution is more likely to have higher levels of democracy, in 
the fonn of its political participation scores. 
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Table 3.5 Electoral Revolution * Level of Political Participation Crosstabulation 




Weak Strong Total 
Electoral No (0) 1 3 1 0 5 
Revolution? Yes (1) 0 3 1 3 7 
Total 1 6 2 3 12 
Source: BTl TransformatIOn Index 2010 
Ruleo/Law 
The third independent variable is a less studied, albeit extremely important 
indicator, of democratic health within a nation. As previously argued in the literature 
review, traditional democratization literature and the transition paradigm often focus too 
heavily on the functioning of elections, while ignoring the utmost importance of the rule 
of law that makes elections, democracy, civil liberties and other desirable attributes a 
possibility. This is especially true when discussing electoral revolutions, which derive 
their focus and power from activities related to elections. As such, rule o/law should be 
an important and unique indicator for this research. As it is often obfuscated when 
discussing electoral revolutions, it is likely that the results here will be enlightening when 
evaluating democratic changes for the region. 
The aggregated scores below are based on the following, four questions: 
1. To what extent is there a working separation o/powers (checks and balances)? 
2. To what extent does an independent judiciary exist? 
3. To what extent are there legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse 
their positions? 
4. To what extent are civil liberties guaranteed and protected, and to what extent 
can citizens seek redress/or violations o/these liberties? (BTl 2010, 17). 
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Table 3.6 BTl Rule of Law Rankings for CIS Countries (2006-2010) 
2006 2008 2010 
Countr Annenia 4.3 4.5 4.5 
y Azerbaijan 4.3 4.3 4.0 
Belarus 3.3 3.0 3.0 
Georgia 6.5 6.0 5.5 
Kazakhstan 4.0 3.8 3.8 
Kyrgyzstan 3.8 5.3 4.0 
Moldova 4.8 6.0 5.8 
Russia 4.8 4.3 4.3 
Tajikistan 3.5 3.3 2.8 
Turkmenistan 2.0 2.3 2.3 
Ukraine 7.0 6.8 6.3 
Uzbekistan 2.5 2.3 2.3 
Source: BTl Transfonnation Index 2006-2010 
The objective for this third democratic variable, according to BTl, is that "state 
powers check and balance one another and ensure civil rights" (2010, 17). Insofar as the 
scores indicate, the CIS countries have been perfonning at relatively low levels when it 
comes to the Rule of Law. For example, according to Table 3.6, an alarming ten of the 
twelve countries experienced overall declines in their scores. Even the overall leader in 
the region, Ukraine, falters on this variable, falling from 7.0 to 6.8 and finally, to 6.3 in 
2010. As the cross-tabulation below shows more clearly, 75 percent of the countries are 
clustered at the lower end of the spectrum, at "very weak" or "weak." Even with 
countries that have experienced an electoral revolution, a majority fall into the lower half 
(four in the "weak" categories versus three in the "strong"). 
Although the earlier aspects of stateness and political participation revealed wide 
variation in CIS scoring, this third variable more strongly signifies a disturbing and 
declining trend in pro-democratic refonn. This finding may be related to the nature of 
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Rule of Law and the four questions the BTl uses in its assessment. They evaluate less 
tangible, enforceable and discernible tenets of democracy than when compared to 
observing fraudulent elections, for example. In Table 3.7, I have tested the claim that 
countries that have undergone electoral revolution are more likely to have higher levels of 
democracy, in the form of rule of law scores. This cross-tabulation shows that the worst 
performing states have not experienced electoral revolution, but only weakly supports the 
claim that states that have undergone an electoral revolution are more likely to have 
higher levels .. When evaluating correlation, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
indicates a stronger relationship (r=.645, 2-tailed sig. =.024). Nonetheless, with Rule of 
Law being weak throughout the region, other factors may be more enlightening. 
Table 3.7 Electoral Revolution * Level of "Rule of Law" Crosstabulation 




Weak Strong Total 
Electoral No (0) 3 2 0 0 5 
Revolution? Yes (1) 1 3 2 1 7 
Total 4 5 2 1 12 
Source: BTl Transformation Index 2010 
Stability of Democratic Institutions 
The fourth independent variable measures the stability of democratic institutions 
within the nation-state. BTl coders ask two simple questions and assign a score between 
1.0 and 10.0 to assess the institutions' overall performance. They ask the following: 
1. Are democratic institutions, including the administrative andjudicial systems, 
capable of performing? 
2. To what extent are institutions of the democratic state accepted or supported by 
the relevant actors? 
(BTl 2010, 17). 
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This variable is included due to its importance in evaluating the differences between 
states that have undergone electoral revolutions versus those that have yet to have civilian 
involvement in this way. One would expect that democratic institutions became stronger 
or more democratic, following massive protests; however, this may not always be the 
case due to systemic, underlying corruption by even the opposition parties or poor check 
on powers to the executive. These factors will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter. 
Table 3.8 BTl Stability of Democratic Institution Rankings 
for CIS Countries (2006-2010) 
Country 2006 2008 2010 
Armenia 6.0 6.0 
Azerbaijan 2.0 2.0 
Belarus 2.0 2.0 
Georgia 7.0 8.0 
Kazakhstan 2.0 2.0 
Kyrgyzstan 2.0 5.0 
Moldova 4.5 7.0 
Russia 5.5 5.5 
Tajikistan 3.0 2.0 
Turkmenistan 1.0 1.0 
Ukraine 6.5 7.5 
Uzbekistan 2.0 2.0 













The main objective of this variable is to assess whether "state powers check one 
another and ensure civil rights" (BTl 2010, 17). Within the overall region, Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Moldova have garnered the highest scores. However, Georgia and Ukraine 
also experienced declines in their scores between the 2008 and the 2010 indices (-1.5 for 
Georgia and -1.0 for Ukraine). Despite this decline, they still stand well above most of 
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their regional counterparts, given that over half of the countries have been scored at or 
below the 2.0 mark. In 2010 alone, eight of the twelve countries were in the recoded in 
the "very weak" range. Interestingly, nearly all of the worst performing countries, with 
the lone exception of Belarus, are geographically located in Central Asia. This division 
leaves the best performing countries closer to Europe, a pattern that has previously 
existed in the other variables but is exceptionally cogent when assessing the stability of 
democratic institutions. 
Table 3.9 Electoral Revolution * Stability of Dem. Institutions 
Crosstabulation 




Weak Strong Total 
Electoral No (0) 4 0 1 0 
Revolution? Yes (1) 4 0 0 3 
5 
7 
Total 8 0 1 3 12 
Source: BTl Transformation Index 2010 
Table 3.9 shows the cross-tabulation between the presence of an electoral revolution 
and the stability of the democratic institutions in the CIS. This table shows a scattered 
and weak relationship between the presence of electoral revolutions and higher levels of 
stability .. When evaluating correlation, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient also indicates 
a somewhat weak relationship (r=A05, 2-tailed sig. =.192). Moreover, there exists an 
extreme volatility for the CIS stability of democratic institutions - with most states 
clustered at the margins. 
Political and Social Integration 
This fifth and final independent variable reflects a dominant theme in the 
democratization literature: that a large and involved civil society will contribute to a well-
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functioning democracy. Keeping this argument in mind, this final assessment will test 
whether the political and social integration within the CIS countries have experienced 
any changes, growth, or impacts on democracy following an electoral revolution. 
Once again, although I am utilizing an aggregate score for comparison, the 
questions and objectives the coders used for the BTl ranking are enlightening. They have 
defined political and social integration as regimes in which "stable patterns of 
representation exist for mediating between society and state; there is a consolidated civic 
culture" (BTl 2010, 17). The four questions for coding are useful to consider. 
1. To what extent is there a stable and socially rooted party system to articulate 
and aggregate societal interests? 
2. To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups 
to mediate between society and the political system? 
3. How strong is citizen consent to democratic norms and procedures? 
4. To what extent have social self-organization and the construction of social 
capital advanced? 
Table 3.10 BTl Political and Social Integration Rankings 
for CIS Countries (2006-2010) 
Country 2006 2008 2010 
Armenia 5.5 5.5 5.8 
Azerbaijan 3.0 3.0 3.3 
Belarus 3.3 3.7 3.7 
Georgia 4.3 5.0 4.8 
Kazakhstan 3.7 3.7 3.3 
Kyrgyzstan 3.7 4.8 4.3 
Moldova 4.5 5.8 6.0 
Russia 4.8 4.0 3.8 
Tajikistan 3.0 3.7 3.3 
Turkmenistan 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Ukraine 6.3 6.0 5.8 
Uzbekistan 2.7 2.3 2.0' 
Source: BTl TransformatIOn Index 2006-2010 
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In evaluating the consolidated civil culture, Table 3.9 shows a wide variation of 
scores for the CIS countries in the 2000s. Most countries (Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) experienced an overall decline; 
while the five others remained stable or saw an increase in their scores (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, and Turkmenistan). Similar to the other variables studied 
thus far, Ukraine projected the most impressive scores, at its regional high of 6.3 in 2006. 
Turkmenistan, the only absolutely static country, scored a regional low of 1.7 in the 
indices. 
Table 3.11 Electoral Revolution * Political & Social Integration Levels 
Crosstabulation 




Weak Strong Total 
Electoral No (0) 2 2 1 0 5 
Revolution? Yes (1) 0 1 3 3 7 
Total 2 3 4 3 12 
Source: BTl Transformation Index 2010 
Given the regional variation and complex patterns in Table 3.10, I have restricted 
the analysis in 3.11. In this cross-tabulation, I tested the claim that CIS countries with 
electoral revolutions are more likely to have higher levels of political and social 
integration, a strong indicator for democratic growth. Thus far, this appears to be one of 
the strongest indicators and support the aforementioned claim. Shown above, the cross-
tabulation indicates that "very weak" and "weak" levels are mostly comprised of 
countries without an electoral revolution. The "strong" and "very strong" categories, on 
the other hand are almost wholly comprised of CIS that have experienced an electoral 
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revolution .. When evaluating correlation, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient suggests a 
very strong relationship (r=.722, 2-tailed sig. =.008). This finding suggests that, unlike 
the previous variables, the connection between electoral revolution and the civil culture 
as expressed through the political and social integration levels is stronger and more 
stable. 
Although this cross-tabulation helps to define this relationship, it is not entirely 
conclusive nor does it eliminate other possibilities. Nonetheless, this finding illustrates 
the positive connection and supports the next section of my work, which will 
qualitatively expand on the role and consolidation of civil society during the Color 
Revolutions. 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter was to find the relationships between electoral 
revolutions and five important indicators of democratization. The 2010 BTl's overall 
assessment of the CIS region is that the "upward trend ... has reversed. The potency of the 
color revolutions has dissipated and the region's autocratic regimes are increasingly 
consolidating their grip on power" (BTl 2010). Ukraine was the only country in the 
region that did not falter on overall previous scores, making it a weak leader for 
democracy in the region. Although this conclusion is accurate, it was important first to 
consider the relationships between these nations, their electoral revolutions and the 
impact on stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of democratic 
institutions, and political and social integration. Considering that many of the cross-
tabulations only presented a weak relationship between the presence of electoral 
revolution and higher levels of democracy, these findings raise further critiques of the 
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simple and dichotomous success-versus-failure paradigm used when assessing the Color 
Revolutions and democratization literature more broadly. 
Nonetheless, with these relationships now determined, the next level of my 
research can more effectively move beyond the aggregate level and attempt to understand 
the nuance within the three case studies: Georgia's Rose Revolution, Ukraine's Orange 
Revolution and Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COLOR REVOLUTIONS INTRODUCTION: 
OPPOSITIONAL PARTIES AND STATE APPARATUS 
This chapter begins with an introduction to·the three case studies of Color 
Revolutions and examines specific variables related higher level politics and stateness. In 
particular, oppositional party, influences and the military or police involvement during 
protests are evaluated while assessing the challenges these detailed comparisons raise to 
the success-versus-failure paradigm. My choice of electoral revolutions for the case 
studies stemmed from the fact that all three were labeled as generally "successful" by 
Kalandadze and Orenstein (2010); yet, upon closer scrutiny in the last chapter, they 
reveal wide variability in terms of actual outcomes, state influences and overall 
democratization scores. 
I will begin with an overview for each country to describe the basic facts of each 
case before comparing all three on the following characteristics: opposition party 
influences and coercive elements by the state apparatus - through military or police 
involvement. The analysis below will also set the stage for the final section of my 
research, which will address the specific youth movements in the three case studies and 
their wider influences on civil society and democratic reform. 
Georgia's Rose Revolution (2003) 
The abridged version of Georgia's Rose Revolution tells the story of a country, 
which had only recently dealt with a civil war and territorial disputes, coming together to 
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protest the authoritarian environment under incumbent President Eduard Shevardnadze. 
Again, to put it perhaps too simply, the revolution was a "success" in that it obtained its 
short-term goal of overturning the election and inaugurating the opposition leader, 
Mikheil Saakashvili (Way, 2008: 63). 
Having already covered the ebb and flow of democratization and hybrid regimes~ 
or semi-democracies, one should reasonably assume that the story does not end here. 
Since these events occurred over seven years ago at the time of this writing, the present-
day politics of Georgia reflect a tumultuous and ill-devised power sharing arrangement 
for its democratically-heralded and seemingly idealistic opposition leadership. Although 
it has not been officially legislated or passed at the time of writing, however, the 
Georgian parliament is currently debating changing its constitution to allow President 
Mikheil Saakashvili the ability to retain power after his term ends in 2013 (Kuzio, 2010: 
286). At this point a success vs. failure paradigm would label the event as a failure, or if 
generous, as a "successful case without democratization," which is exactly what 
Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) did. The following introduction to the Rose Revolution 
does not suggest, or even attempt to claim, that the Georgian uprisings led to full and 
progressive democratic change; instead, it argues that the people-the citizens 
themselves-have been largely left out of the picture and may reflect a more nuanced 
view on the subject at hand. The capital city of Tbilisi may not be the beacon of hope for 
the region that it was in 2003, but while the highest powers may still engage in 
consolidatory, authoritarian struggles, the evidence suggests that the citizens themselves 
do not wish for, nor would they tolerate a full reversal back to authoritarian kleptocracy. 
In the post-Soviet state of Georgia, former President Shevardnadze's dominant 
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party was relatively strong and successful, especially when compared with other 
countries - as illustrated later in Ukraine, for example. His success came in that he was 
able to establish a powerful, single party in the mid-1990s following the breakup of the 
Soviet Union and Georgia's subsequent independence. In the establishment of his party, 
the Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG), he developed a strong foothold in the electoral 
politics that were represented in his executive office holding, as well as in the majority of 
parliamentary holding (Way, 2008: 63). In a path-dependent historical understanding of 
Georgian events and the present-day political power struggle the nation currently faces, 
an understanding of the party politics in pre-Rose Revolution Georgia will be 
illuminating. 
In other words, rather than looking only to national elections, one can evaluate the 
situation to find problems that are structural and inherent to the Georgian political 
system, and manifested in the party relations. For while Shevardnadze was able to 
consolidate his power into a relatively strong party, the Citizens' Union of Georgia had a 
number of problems, which still playa role today. Most notably, according to Lucan Way 
(2008), a regional scholar who has also written extensively on what he deems 
"competitive authoritarianism," the CUG had inherent problems that led to President 
Shevardnadze's downfall. He writes that although it was successful and strong, "The 
CUa, however, lacked any obvious ideology and was in large measure a patronage 
machine for Shevardnadze loyalists" (Lucan, 2009: 63). While this characteristic is 
problematic for democratic legitimacy, it is not necessarily problematic for an 
authoritarian leader, such as Shevardnadze, who was only inheriting and arguably 
continuing the Soviet nomenklatura authoritarianism. 
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Ironically and interestingly, in this case, the lack of ideology did become 
problematic when Shevardnadze's popularity among Georgian citizens and even among 
his former loyalist supporters declined immensely. Lucan continues describing the party 
struggles and notes that, 
[a]fter the president's popularity began to wane, his major allies-Mikheil 
Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania, and Nino Burdjanadze-abandoned him, and 
the party disintegrated in the late 2001 and early 2002. These same 
politicians led the Rose Revolution in 2003 (2008: 63, emphasis added). 
In this account of party politics, one finds that the future opposition leader and current 
President Saakashvili was actually a former staunch supporter of the authoritarian regime 
led by Shevardnadze. As the protestors stormed the parliamentary building in Tbilisi in 
2003, it was Saakashvili who greeted the current president, rose in hand, and forced him 
to flee (Lucan, 2008: 64). The same opposition leader who not only led the revolution, 
but contributed to one of its most lasting and impressionable images of reform, is the 
same person who is currently trying to hold onto power via parliamentary reforms. 
Unsurprisingly, this complicated narrative is seldom told in scholarly or 
journalistic accounts of the Rose Revolution. In conducting research, Way's (2008) article 
was the only scholar I found to fully address the convolutions of party influence. Though 
Saakashvili is now considered to be power hungry and less than democratic, initial 
reports did not mention his close affiliation with the authoritarian regime. Additionally, 
those like Stewart (2009) or Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) have painted him as the 
democratic reformer. The fact that he, too, fell prey to an extra-constitutional power 
struggle exemplifies the overarching failures and challenges to democratization in the 
country. The full reality, as illustrated above, is a mixed bag: multifarious and full of 
intricacies that are often left untold. Moreover, these complexities reflect the need for 
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additional, often imperceptible details while also suggesting that entrenched 
authoritarianism may continue to be a problem within this post-Soviet space. To suggest 
that the failures were on part of a "failed" protest takes a rash all-or-nothing stance, 
which ignores deep-seated, structural afflictions. 
The structural problems may also be manifested through the coercive abilities of 
the state and, relatedly, the tactics which are chosen by the protestors. Once again, Lucan 
Way, is insightful on this topic in asserting that "regimes with little coercive capacity-
owing to small or underequipped security forces, substantial wage arrears, or loss in a 
major war-have had far more difficulty coping with even modest protest" (2009: 62). 
Looking to this factor will allow for a detailed view of the state's abilities and revolution's 
effectiveness. 
In the case of Georgia, the strength of the coercive state was decidedly weak. In 
the early 1990s, Georgia not only lost territories to secessionist groups, but it additionally 
entered into a civil war in the early 1990s that shattered its coercive abilities. Because of 
these events, Georgian forces had to deal with the constant threat (and realities) of 
regional rebellion and war, which levied monetary burdens that the regime simply could 
not handle. These threats and the economic unpreparedness were pushed to a breaking 
point with the relatively "sporadic" protests that broke out in 2003 in response to 
President Shevardnadze's attempted rigging of parliamentary elections (Bunce and 
Wolchik, 2006: 6). 
On November 22,2003, tens of thousands of protesters demonstrated while future 
President Saakashvili and allies faced very little resistance from the police as they entered 
parliament. In a quick change, Shevardnadze fled and resigned the next day (Bunce and 
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Wo1chik, 2006). In an interview following the affair, the interior minister acknowledged 
that the police had not been paid in three months and asked, "So why should they have 
obeyed Shevardnadze?" (Way, 2009: 62). This additional detail once again illustrates the 
need to look beyond labels of success or failure and review underlying facts related to the 
revolutions. Georgia's Rose Revolution, it could be argued, may owe its initial triumphs 
partly to the fact that the coercive forces of the state simply failed or did not begrudgingly 
follow the leader's orders. Whereas other countries, such a Belarus, have also seen 
protests, the state has been more efficient in responding and quelling resistance 
movements (Manning, 2007: 173). That case is outside the scope of this research; 
however, it is an important point to bear in mind that the contingency of "success" and 
"failure" may rely on seemingly insignificant, yet structurally unique aspects of a 
country. 
Ukraine's Orange Revolution (2004) 
In less than two decades since independence, Ukraine has experienced 
considerable growth in its civil society and verbalized commitments to democratic ideals 
that have further removed the country from its Soviet past (Kuzio, 2010). Without a 
doubt, the 2004 revolution in Ukraine was the most significant action the citizenry and 
oppositional parties have taken to assert their desires for pro-democratic change. The 
sheer size of these protests put the Orange Revolution at the center of the world stage. 
Interestingly, too, of the three countries discussed, Ukraine is the only one considered a 
"full" success by Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009). They see it as a successful case with 
clear democratization, thusly reinforcing the notion from the Bertelsmann Stiftung 
Transformation Index that Ukraine is leading the charge for democratization within CIS 
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countries. As the section below will illustrate, once again, the country actually embodies 
a more multifaceted view -neither fully successful, nor failing. Instead, my analysis finds 
that this apparently democratic leader is still plagued and characterized by existing 
structural problems, which should be looked at for a meaningful and nuanced 
understanding of both Ukraine's continued democratic success, as well as for the region 
as a whole. 
Differing from Georgia, the leaders of Ukraine had less party organization and 
relied heavily upon a smattering of competing parties. Taras Kuzio (2010), a Ukrainian 
who has written extensively on the country's politics, noted that the alliances were bound 
together by short-term patronage and coalitions that rarely lasted, even within Ukraine's 
short history (30). Ukraine's president, Leonid Kuchma, relied heavily on a loose 
coalition of parties, and these precarious affiliations kept him from fully consolidating 
political control. After various scandals, including arms sales and "Kuchmagate" in 
which the president was supposedly aware of and tangentially supported the murder of an 
opposition journalist, Kuchma's approval ratings plummeted into single digits (Way, 
2008). It was surprising, then, that his hand-picked candidate won the presidential 
election against the hugely popular Viktor Yushchenko. Upon this alleged win, which was 
fraught with voting irregularities and clearly rigged, citizens took to the Ukrainian capital 
of Kyiv in late November 2004 to protest the results and demand a re-vote. Way (2008) 
evaluates Ukrainian party formation and writes of Kuchma: 
Quarrels between allies prevented Kuchma from instituting stronger 
presidential rule. And after the release of tapes pointing to corruption and 
ties to illegal arms sales, the president's popularity declined, and previous 
allies, including Yuliya Tymoshenko, Yushchenko and numerous other 
officials, moved into the opposition. Virtually the entire leadership of the 
Orange Revolution had in fact been closely allied with the president just a 
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few years prior to the 2004 presidential election that brought the collapse 
of the Kuchma regime (62-63). 
Though Yushchenko did not have to storm parliament or deliver a rose to Viktor 
Yanukovych, he did go on to beat the dominant party-backed opponent in the re-vote, 
thus reaching the Orange Revolution's short-term goal. 
As seen in Georgia just one year earlier, there exists a pattern of former dominant 
party elites falling out of line and forming an oppositional coalition. Yushchenko, by most 
measures, was much more democratically progressive than his Georgian counterpart, but 
this did not necessarily translate into political efficacy, as he was not altogether 
successful as a politician. To the dismay and upset of many in the West, as well as his few 
remaining supporters, Yushchenko received only approximately 5% of the presidential 
vote in 2010 (BBC News, 18 Jan. 2010). To add insult to injury for this incumbent, he 
also suffered a hUmiliating defeat to his former alliance partner Yuliya Tymoshenko and 
ultimately, lost the position to Yanukovych, the former criminal and pro-Russian 
opponent the country rallied to defeat in the Orange Revolution. Given these challenges 
to long-term democratic change, the labeling of this revolution as "successful with 
democratization," suggests that Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) repeat their earlier 
mistake in not fully accounting for nuance within their stringent and arbitrarily discrete 
classifications. 
Ukraine's strong and unyielding coercive apparatus is, perhaps, less instructive 
than in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan's revolutions. Only persistent protesting in the capital 
city center and satellite cities led to change for the Orange protestors. Unlike Georgia, 
which had not paid its police for months, Ukraine had an intensive, well-paid and 
encompassing security enforcement system with police officers and military officials. 
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These authoritative figures did not curtail the protests; however, they strongly defended 
government buildings so that the opposition's only hope was the three-week-Iong massive 
demonstrations (Kuzio, 2010). Way supports this claim in writing that "the relative 
strength of the Ukrainian state made regime overthrow impossible without large-scale 
protest" (2008: 64). Whereas other countries, like Georgia, maintained only sporadic 
protest, this extensive security apparatus forced the continued and higher-risk 
involvement of long demonstrations by the opposition leaders and, more importantly, 
extremely dedicated citizens demanding change. 
Nonetheless, it seems that full democratization has not reached Ukraine, despite 
being labeled as the region's most successful revolution. Though impressive changes 
were reached in the short-term election ofYushchenko, coalition in-fighting and the more 
recent election ofYanukovych suggest a multifaceted view of the country and its 
positionality within the movement toward a full democracy. 
The election ofYanukovych was closely watched and he was fairly elected; 
however, he seems to represent a repositioning back to pro-Russian rhetoric. For 
example, he has appointed an administration made up of former Kuchma officials, 
selected a cabinet of which half the members come from his home region of Donetsk, and 
has now infamously partaken in a "crossing of red lines" including the extension of the 
Black Sea Fleet (Kuzio, 201Oa). David Kramer, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for European and Eurasian Affairs, wrote in the Kyiv Post, that "Yanukovych's 
denial of the 1933 famine as a 'genocide' during his PACE speech on the same day as the 
Black Sea Fleet ratification was 'like pouring oil on an already simmering fire in 
Ukraine's polarized politics'" (quoted in Kuzio, 2010a). These events put Ukrainian 
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politics on the world stage once again; this time, in an infamous news story characterized 
by violent antics including egg-throwing and smoke bombs within a parliamentary 
session. Therefore, without completely reversing Kalandadze or Orenstein's decision and 
simply regarding it as a failure, these details serve as a reminder that one should 
qualitatively and robustly understand the environment and the changes that may be in 
store for the divided Ukrainian nation. 
Kyrgy~tan's Tu/ip/Pink Revolution (2005) 
The last of the Color Revolutions considered in this research is Kyrgyzstan's Tulip 
or Pink Revolution, which was the most recent of those covered, occurring in 2005. 
Though obviously still within the post-Soviet space, Kyrgyzstan's Central Asian location 
provides some regional variance to this three-way comparison. Additionally, as a small 
country roughly the size of South Dakota, and as a relatively more rural country, 
Kyrgyzstan faced unique challenges in its oppositional organizing and protest tactics 
(Khamidov, 2006: 85). Before assessing its particular experience, it is first important to 
understand the basic thrust of the Tulip Revolution and its resulting changes. 
Like the other two revolutions already discussed, Kyrgyzstan's democratic 
revolution was the result of the attempted holdover of power by the incumbent party. 
Most notably, President Askar Akayev was removed from power, which was the major 
anticipated goal of the protests. Similar to the 2003 Georgian revolution, in Kyrgyzstan 
an initially small number of protesters led to impressive and considerably large 
transformations. A couple hundred Kyrgyzstanis challenged the incumbent authoritarian 
regime by staging takeovers of regional government buildings and outposts. President 
Akayev, then, gave up power during an antigovernment rally in the capital city of 
47 
Bishkek (Sharkov, 2008). The numbers of that rally are approximated at a much-larger 
ten thousand and ultimately aided in the swift ousting of Akayev and his fairly-elected 
replacement, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. 
Following in line with the other cases, it is likely unsurprising that the election of 
Bakiyev did not result in a teleological progression with an absolute end goal, or the 
massive spread of democratic ideals throughout Kyrgyzstan. Instead, the country has 
faced its vast share of hardships ranging from riots, to ethnic violence, all the while 
concurrently dealing with a recent coup of the once-idealized, new leader. 
President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was reelected in early 2009, but the election itself 
was laden with protests and accusations of ballot stuffing, events that were reminiscent of 
pre-Tulip Revolution politics (Sharkov, 2008). The years following the Tulip Revolution 
have also seen a marked return to the abuse of presidential power. The resulting coup in 
April 2010 came after Bakiyev's speculative involvement with the murders of prominent 
opposition politicians (Freedman, 2009: 843-45). The escalating ethnic violence and riots 
of April 2010 led to the coup and an exile of President Bakiyev, who relinquished his 
presidential position only to assert that it was rightfully his a few months later in July 
2010 (Lally, 12 Oct. 2010). Interestingly as well, although beyond the scope ofthls paper, 
Bakiyev sought exile in Belarus, a country that had weathered an attempted electoral 
revolution without the anticipated change of authoritarian rule. Currently, an interim 
government is in place as Bakiyev still attempts to assert his position as president after 
tendering his resignation (Lally, 12 Oct. 2010). 
As in Ukraine and Georgia, the opposition leadership emerged from the previous 
regime's fallout in Kyrgyzstan. So, too, in Kyrgyzstan, did the incumbent party suffer 
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from a lack of ideology and loosely connected coalitions that fell apart to support the 
opposition leader, Bakiyev, in 2005. And in Kyrgyzstan, the opposition was able to meet 
its short-term goals due to the lack of coercive capacity in the state. Just as in Georgia, 
the military and security services via the police forces did not stand up to the serious, 
albeit somewhat small, protests in the capital city ofBishkek, Kyrgyzstan (Freedman, 
2009: 843). 
One dissimilar feature was that Kyrgyzstan had not recently been threatened by 
recent military defeats or a civil war within its territory, unlike Georgia's worn-thin and 
inadequately funded security apparatus. Nonetheless, Kyrgyzstani police fared similarly 
that they were asked to defend a state that had not provided for them; the police force was 
"severely underpaid and often to buy their own fuel and uniforms" (Way, 2008: 68). 
According to a political scientist, Scott Radnitz (2006), who was present in Kyrgyzstan at 
the time of the Tulip Revolution, the police struck deals with protestors to ignore or stand 
aside as the opposition took over local government buildings. Their demonstration did 
not reach the impressive numbers or excruciating length of the Orange Revolution; 
however, the inadequacy of the security apparatus in Kyrgyzstan led to very similar, 
sweeping reforms in the election process. In other words, they were more limited in 
number but still achieved the same end-result: strong electoral reform and the election of 
a new leader. 
Unlike Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan also had considerably less support from Western 
actors hoping to permanently instill democratic values. This support was not entirely 
absent, given that Kyrgyzstan, until very recently, played a role in providing an important 
military base to the U. S. for the war in Afghanistan and, therefore, was an ally in the 
49 
continuing War on Terror (Harding, 4 Feb. 2009). However, the geographic reality of 
being situated within Central Asia did not bestow upon Kyrgyzstan the same amount of 
democratic frenzy that existed in the European crossroads of Ukraine, for example. 
Relatedly, the added enticement of EU membership was not a compelling factor, as it 
arguably has been (or was) in Ukraine. The protest style in Kyrgyzstan also seemed to 
reflect a change and relative inefficacy of democratic NGOs and ill-advised protestors: 
The attempts and relationships between local NGOs and Western actors 
. could not prevent the revolution from developing into mass looting. Very 
few died in these cases, not because the opposition relied on nonviolent 
strategies but because the military and police quickly dispersed in the face 
of mass protest (Way, 2008: 58). 
The geographic location, lack of strong party politics and an unstable security apparatus 
were factors leading to the initial achievements of the Tulip Revolution. The past year, 
however, has illustrated a number of difficulties for the fledgling democracy. 
As the elected president remains in exile and the interim government attempts to 
pick up the pieces of a coup, ethnic violence, and recent pressures from neighboring 
Russia (who pressured the small republic to close the aforementioned US military base), 
it may be too soon for scholars to assert that this event was a "success." Instead, a view 
that accounts for the existing structural challenges and entrenched authoritarian nature of 
the regime should be accounted for in a meaningful and qualitative manner. To call this 
event a success (even one "without democratization" ala Kalandadze and Orenstein 
[2009]) undermines other events in the area and avoids the question of whether or not the 
new political leaders have democratic ideals at heart. 
Summary 
Through broader understanding of revolution and, additionally, of what classifies 
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one as a "success" or "failure," this research hoped to illustrate that the events between 
2003 and 2005 in Eastern and Central Europe are in need of more detailed, qualitative 
study. While it is true that the Rose, Orange and TuliplPink Revolutions mainly found 
their achievements via judicial invalidations of fraudulent elections, the fact remains that 
these decisions simply would not have been possible without the "outpouring" of citizens 
into the streets of capital cities and, at times, into the halls of parliaments (Fairbanks, 
2007: 45). 
While the subsequent changes may reflect challenges to the system, it should not 
be forgotten that a change in people's recognition of the political system was necessary to 
make the revolutions possible in the first place. It is, therefore, rash to label these events 
as successes or failures as soon as five years after they took place. The overwhelming 
feeling among citizens that they can "never go back" to pre-Color Revolution practices 
suggests that change is ongoing in the post-Soviet landscape (Fairbanks, 2007: 56). 
On the topic of future research and changes within Georgia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan, it would seem that scholars and other interested parties should look to 
people's perceptions as well as the structural challenges, other than solely viewing 
national elections as ways to challenge the authoritarian status quo. Furthermore, the false 
dichotomy between "success" and "failure" or, relatedly "democratized" and "non-
democratized," inevitably erases important distinctions and results in irreducible or 
inaccurate claims about the regimes in question. The reality is much more nuanced and 
requires both detailed case studies and robust comparisons for a fuller understanding of 
these recent changes. The next section continues in this vein, assessing an important but 
often misunderstood factor in the Color Revolutions: the youth movements. 
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CHAPTER V 
YOUTH MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
"Give your children too much freedom and lose your own. " - Russian proverb 
In assessing his home country's Tulip Revolution, Alisher Khamidov, a Kyrgyz 
journalist, writes that "post-Soviet political elites share two common features in their 
attitudes toward youth: one, they fear youth involvement in politics, and two, they want 
to control it" (2006: 85). Considering that the children of Soviet independence played a 
crucial role in the electoral revolutions of the early 2000s, the strength and resilience of 
youth movements is a powerful indicator of democratic change in this region. 
Furthermore, since youth movements were hugely present and predominant in the Color 
Revolutions, beginning in Serbia's 2000 Bulldozer Revolution, they have often been cited 
by scholars and policymakers. Despite this attention, the analyses of these groups have 
been somewhat superficial and at worst, mistakenly portray them as rabble rousers. This 
misinterpretation is due in part to propaganda and chicanery put forth by the post-Soviet 
elites in their attempt to hold onto ruling powers (Nikolayenko; 2007). A more in-depth 
discussion, however, reveals a strong regional diffusion of youth movements, the growth 
of a political generation, and important roles as decisive, as well as divisive, civil society 
leaders in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. 
It is important to bear in mind that the members of this generation, which came-
to-age under newly independent and nationalist states, largely embraced a pro-Western 
and idealistic viewpoint in comparison to their earlier counterparts. With few, if any, 
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memories of living under the rule of the Soviet Union, these youth grew up in a culture 
that allowed them to balance popular culture and political interests specific to their states. 
Despite attempts by post-Soviet leaders to mimic the Soviet Komsomol and create pro-
governmental youth associations, many of the new nations saw an emergence of a more 
grassroots-oriented and pro-democratic youth culture (Khamidov, 2006: 85). 
Ultimately, this carte blanche background, accompanied by a growth in education 
levels, allowed progressive youth to reclaim a national identity and embrace a pro-
democratic fervor that would ultimately aid in ousting the holdovers of Soviet regimes. 
As such, the youth movements worked to encourage a growth of civil society in the post-
Soviet sphere while being at the forefront of protest lines to usher in democratic ideals. 
The Kmara (translated as Enough), civic organization in Georgia, Pora! (It's Time!) in 
Ukraine and finally, KelKel (Renaissance) in Kyrgyzstan all played roles in the 
development and carrying out of their respective color revolutions (Sharkov, 2008; Bunce 
and Wolchik, 2006). While it is important also to recognize that these groups did receive 
funding from pro-democracy NGOs and the U.S. government, one should be careful not 
to entirely dismiss their effectiveness and grass roots organizing, a slight that has 
happened all too often in reporting on the Color Revolutions of these countries. 
The section that follows will include a comparative analysis of the movements in 
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Following with the arguments laid out earlier in the 
research, the attempt is not to persuade the reader to label one movement as a success or 
failure, but rather to allow for a deeper understanding of these movements within the 
context of an electoral revolution and subsequently, the civil society framework of their 
nation-states. Additionally, as stated in literature review, a problematic penchant of the 
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democratic transition paradigm is to concentrate on political elites. The comparison of 
youth movements and their roles in the larger context of political and societal change is 
my attempt to challenge this myopic view of democracy, democracy-building, and 
transitional change. While my account only reviews the post-Soviet sphere, recent events 
in the Middle East and North Africa, for example, illustrate the power held by younger 
generations to fiercely and effectively challenge the ingrained status quo of generations' 
past. 
YOUTH MOVEMENTS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
It has been highly problematic for these youth movements to be seriously and 
rigorously studied for several reasons. First, as already mentioned, is the issue of post-
Soviet rulers obfuscating their roles and aiding in the creation of other youth groups to 
mask actual grassroots organizing (Khamidov, 2006). Secondly, as with most studies on 
democratization, the role of political elites has been central to analyses, while leaving less 
powerful individuals and organizations at the margins. Finally, as Olena Nikolayenko 
(2007) points out, there has been a dearth of theoretical underpinnings in the post-
communist area and a failure to connect social movement theory to that of political 
generations (175). Before continuing with a systematic analysis of the youth movements 
and civil society organizing, this section will outline movement and political generation 
theories, which are important and illuminating for the purposes of my research. 
The political opportunity framework and modular political action, in association 
with generational theory, offer deep theoretical grounding for the Color Revolutions and, 
in particular, the role played by the youth movements. The political opportunity 
framework and Sidney Tarrow's (1998) detailed accounts of social movements help us to 
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understand the formation and very existence of these groups. On the other hand, modular 
political action and the concept of a "political generation" allow for insights related to 
diffusion and the shared experiences of youth within this bounded region and time period. 
Taken together, these assessments will yield a better understanding of the youth 
movements and ultimately support my hypothesis that a better developed civil society 
leads to a longer-lasting and more effective electoral revolution, while challenging 
dominant transitional success-versus-failure paradigm described in Chapter I. 
Political Opportunity Theory 
First, the political opportunity framework attempts to outline a clear 
understanding of social movements and most importantly, their beginnings (Nikolayenko, 
2007: 174). Using this theory, Tarrow (1998) laid out a powerful account of social 
movements and contentious politics in Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. 
Drawing upon his work and its adoption by comparative political scientists, like 
Nikolayenko, one can see that an account of political opportunity "provides a fruitful 
starting point to assess the likelihood of protest activity from a comparative perspective" 
(2007: 175). Tarrow, moreover, is very careful in defining a social movement. He makes 
the cautious distinction between movements and political parties or advocacy groups, 
which find a better fit within a political elite power structure. Instead, according to 
Tarrow, a social movement is one that collectively presents challenges to elites, 
authorities, other power-holding groups or social norms and is acted on "by people with 
common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and 
authorities" (1998: 3-4). Tarrow's definition does specifically mention interaction with 
elite power-structures; it is, nonetheless, clear that the main thrust of his interest and the 
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central topic of the theory focuses on the actions of the masses. 
The most important information gleaned from a political opportunity approach in 
general and Tarrow's theory in particular, is in examining the emergence of a movement. 
Nikolayenko (2007) rightfully notes that "the core argument of this approach is that 
changes in the political environment influence the chances for mass mobilization" (174). 
Among these so-called changes in a political environment, Tarrow specifically points out 
the following as most influential and most common in mobilization: increasing access to 
participation, elite divisions, shifting alignments, influential allies, and lastly, repression 
(1998: 3-4). By contextualizing the youth movements of the Color Revolutions within a 
political opportunity framework, the causes of their emergence will become even clearer 
and more important. This approach will, furthermore, aid in depicting a path-dependent 
historical analysis that will illuminate their respective similarities and differences in 
realizing the goals of democratic change. This type of grassroots-aided theory will 
become important in moving beyond a top-tiered approach to post-Soviet politics while 
gradiating the success vs. failure paradigm that has so often plagued democratic transition 
literature. 
This theory is important in deducing causes or triggering factors of contentious 
politics; however, the initial mobilizing causes tell very little about the lasting effects of 
the politically-motivated revolutions. To that end, the remaining analysis must be 
supplemented with related theory to account for other changes within the post-Soviet 
sphere during the tumultuous and monumental early-to-mid 2000s. For this account, I 
tum to modular political action and political generational theory to attempt an 
explanation in the variability, diffusion and shared experiences across thousands of miles 
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and nearly half a decade in the CIS countries evaluated here. 
Modular Political Action 
Modular political action, despite its cryptic naming, is mostly an attempt to 
understand the diffusion of actions across time or regions. Drawing upon work by Mark 
R. Beissinger (2007), a CIS-region scholar, it is utilized here to account for the diffusion 
of Color Revolutions throughout the former Soviet Union. Beissinger's account is 
insightful; however, unlike my research, his account relied strongly on the patterns of the 
movement from one electoral revolution to the next, without paying close attention to the 
mobilizing attributes that we are able to glean from the addition ofTarrow's theoretical 
perspective. Nonetheless, his account and modular political action do provide a second 
piece to the puzzle in understanding the formation, growth and ultimate conclusions of 
the youth movements in question. Simply put, Beissinger's account of modular political 
action, in general, refers to political acts or movements that are largely based on the 
emulation or iteration of prior successful examples (2007: 259). Using modularity and its 
emulative phenomena as a theoretical guide, a study of collective action can then 
concentrate and account for the shared patterns of mobilizing frames, repertoires of 
political action, and "modes of contention" across cases (Sharp, 1993; Beissinger, 2007: 
261). Writing of the Color Revolutions, in particular, Beissinger continues: 
The revolutions that have materialized among the post-communist states 
since 2000 are examples of a modular phenomenon in this sense, with 
prior successful examples affecting the materialization of subsequent 
cases. Each successful democratic revolution has produced an experience 
that has been consciously borrowed by others, spread by NGOs, and 
emulated by local social movements, forming the contours of a model 
(2007: 261). 
An in-depth discussion of the models and their particularities follow, but for the time 
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being, it is useful to note that the iterations of electoral revolutions studied clearly follow 
certain protesting and theatrical techniques, embraced similar logos, sloganeering, and 
modes of communication. A closer analysis, supported by the works of those like 
Beissinger, shows that this type of movement did not appear out of thin air but instead, 
emerged under carefully calculated guidance and leadership in the wake of unique local 
events. In particular, a playbook by political scientist Gene Sharp of the Albert Einstein 
Institute ushered in a standard for protesting techniques in the region and thusly 
characterized the formats of the Color Revolutions in question. Sharp's 1973 book, The 
Politics o/Nonviolent Action, as well as his more recent work under the umbrella of the 
Institute has been instrumental, if not infamous, for would-be democratic supporters 
throughout hybrid or failing regimes, particularly those within the post-Soviet sphere. 
And although Tarrow's account of contentious politics and movement formation will tell 
us that the mobilizing causes are different, a supplemental approach from modular 
political action can illustrate this type of diffusion across nation-state lines. 
Political Generations 
Finally, in connection with the phenomena of this emulative political action, one 
must also consider the shared history and backgrounds of the individuals who led and 
formed these groups. Although Beissinger's account of diffusion through modular 
political action considers shared cultural characteristics of the various youth movements, 
he does not go far enough to speak of a political generation, which seems to have played 
a momentous role in characterizing the surge in youth involvement of the electoral 
revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (Beissinger, 2007: 263). Specifically, 
this third theoretical piece is essential in developing a more robust and complete picture 
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of the types of individuals who became involved, as well as the unique, generational 
timing of the Color Revolutions. While a political generation is, admittedly, closely 
connected to the cultural characteristics Beissinger developed in modular political action 
theory, I argue that the growth and remarkable generational changes characteristic of the 
post -Soviet landscape require a more in-depth analysis. 
Before describing the uniqueness of the Color Revolutions' youthful protest 
movements, it is first necessary to define what exactly is meant by a "political 
generation" within comparative political theory. For the purposes of this research, 
political generation is defined as "a group of individuals who have undergone the same 
basic historical experiences during their formative years" (Rintala, 1968: 93). In addition 
to sharing formative experiences, Braungart and Braungart (1989, 1991), who studied the 
American 1960s protest movements, point out that whenever a particular age group acts 
together to create political change, a political generation is formed (297). They continue 
that, 
According to generational theory, an age group is transformed into a 
political generation when a bond is created among its members based on 
their unique growing-up experiences in society and a shared feeling that 
they have a mission to perform by changing the political status quo 
(Braungart and Braungart, 1991: 299). 
In other words, where a sense of community did not exist before, a more cohesive and 
bounded generational group comes into being through mutual and concerted political 
efforts. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the formation of new, sovereign nations and the 
related move away from communism all are likely to impact the generations coming to 
age during such an epoch of tumult and monumental change. 
Research supports this claim, finding that these shared political experiences exist 
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throughout political movements more broadly, but is most often acted upon by younger 
generations. Recent history and social changes indicate that the vast majority of age 
groups who are mobilized to resist political change consist of young people, especially 
students (Braungart and Braungart 1991, Esler 1982, Nikolayenko 2007). This finding is 
not entirely surprising but is central to understanding the Color Revolutions as sites for 
political change. Scholars discussing generational theory continually debate whether or 
not political generations actually result in long-lasting change, or whether they simply 
youthful, "deviant" political aspirations (Rothman and Lichter, 1982). However, the crux 
of the matter in this case is that the youth movements were a strong mobilizing force in 
high-level electoral reforms and democratic transformations. Whether or not this 
particular generation will stay committed to democratic reforms as they age remains to be 
seen, but a comparative study of their tactics and commitments during the Color 
Revolutions is enlightening when evaluating the short-term successes and dynamism of 
CIS civil society. 
It is this theoretical grounding in political generation theory, the diffusive 
explanations of modular political action and lastly, Tarrow's political opportunity 
framework that will allow for a more complete and three-pronged explanation of the 
youth movements and connected civil society in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. In 
addition of the theories chosen, my choice to hone in on a large, albeit complex and oft- ' 
misunderstood, force within the Color Revolutions was made in order to move away from 
elite-level electoral politics. While many may narrowly concentrate on success or failure 
in terms of opposition party seats and share of the vote in Prime Minister or Presidential 
elections, the lasting changes of the Color Revolutions are arguably less obvious and still 
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foment under the surface of high-level politics. Keeping this underlying purpose in mind 
and having established a theoretical underpinning for my analysis, it is possible to fully 
assess this key component of civil society in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan during 
their respective Color Revolutions. 
YOUTH MOVEMENTS IN COMPARISON: KMARA, PORA! AND KELKEL 
The opening of this comparative study differs from most in that, by way of an 
introduction, I shall begin my discussion by mentioning an organization that is outside 
the scope of my chosen cases. Erstwhile, I have made a focused effort to comprehend the 
multifaceted and complex electoral changes in the Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolutions. 
However, when I began this section, I found that an analysis of youth movements in the 
post-Soviet sphere would be incomplete, inaccurate and profane without a brief 
introduction to Otpor, the Serbian youth group, which partially led and mobilized the 
foundational Bulldozer Revolution. 
In 2000, Otpor (translated: "resistance") laid the groundwork and set forth an 
example of what youth movements could accomplish in a hybrid regime, characterized 
by entrenched Soviet-style leadership, corruption and electoral authoritarianism 
(Schedler, 2006). Moreover, the three youth movements central to my analysis drew 
inspiration and received training from this group after the successful toppling of President 
Slobodan Milosevic in September 2000. Otpor came to fruition under distinctive Serbian 
challenges, including an atmosphere characterized by genocide, extreme interethnic 
hatred and dismal mistrust of politicians (Nikolayenko 2007: 178). For the sake of brevity 
and because it does not directly factor into my research, these topics will not be discussed 
at great length. Suffice it to say that Otpor was beset by many direct challenges to its 
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political atmosphere; nonetheless, through the nonviolent guidebook and leadership of 
Gene Sharp, funding and training by Western actors, and allies within the broader civil 
society, the group mobilized for political transformation and came to symbolize a 
movement of pro-democratic, post-Soviet youth that could be emulated and expanded 
across the region. 
Additionally, Otpor's logo choice was a bold variation on a historically-significant 
theme: a clenched black fist, which drew its inspiration from the red fist symbol of 
Bolshevik resistance against the czar.5 This reclamation of history, as well as other 
courageous and outsider tactics such as graffiti, rock concerts and street theatrics would 
give frustrated youth an outlet and toolbox for revolution that was then reiterated across 
state lines according to their own unique political opportunities (Steinberg, 2008) 
The Color Revolution's "Political Generation" 
The aforementioned mobilizing events and shared characteristics help explain the 
variance in the youth movements during these Color Revolutions. However, returning to 
Nikolayenko (2007), the very title of her article, "The Revolt of the Post-Soviet 
Generation," indicates that there was something quite exemplary about this generation, 
those who came to age during this period, including their unique relationship to politics 
and a perhaps increasingly foreign-seeming, Soviet-inherited ruling class. 
Without a doubt, obvious differences do exist, and I do not intend to paint a 
picture that all Georgian, Ukrainian and Kyrgyzstani youth are the same. Clear 
differences may be seen by just looking at basic statistical indicators. The poverty rate, or 
those subsisting on less than $2 a day, is one illuminating example. In 2005, Georgia's 
5 Please see Appendix B for a graphical listing oflogos from the post-Soviet youth movements 
discussed. 
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poverty rate approached an overwhelming 30%, while Kyrgyzstan did not fare much 
better at 27%. These higher levels stand in stark contrast to that of Ukraine, which stood 
at only 2%, according to figures from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Similarly, the 
aforementioned rural to urban population percentages account for a much different lived 
experience. And while all three are technically situated within the CIS region, the actual 
distance among them is immense. Not only do these countries consist of vastly different 
landscapes and cultures, simply to get from the capital city of Kyiv, Ukraine to Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan, one would need to travel over 2,100 miles. To further contextualize this 
distance, a flight between the two 'cities takes approximately 4 hours and 30 minutes, 
making the diffusion of similar protest tactics and electoral revolutions all that more 
remarkable. 
Here, I have only scratched the surface of the differences between the lived 
experiences of the individuals who comprised the Georgian, Ukrainian or Kyrgyzstani 
youth movements. My purpose in pointing out these factors is not to attempt a definition 
or touchstone of their lived experiences but rather, to illustrate the extent to which they 
have clearly varying opportunities or lifestyles. This factor should not be forgotten, but 
much more important to my research, however, is a comparison of the ways in which 
they are similar and encompass a political generation. Aside from the obvious 
experiences of rallying around an electoral failure, the section below will concentrate on 
factors that contributed to unrest, knowledge and ease of involvement within the youth 
movements in the first place. These include the growth in higher education as well as a 
post-Soviet search for national identity or recognition. 
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Education: Site of Growth and Reformation 
Education is an important starting place in two ways: as a site for networking, but 
also as a source of discontent or area for reform. Furthermore, not only has education 
been connected to the emergence of new elites through revolution, but it has long been 
linked to democratization more broadly (Goldstone, 2001: 39). For example, while free 
and fair elections were the main driving force behind youth movement organizing in the 
three countries, educational reform was a secondary source of mobilization, as will be 
discussed in the next section. Discontent with university corruption was not a critical 
tipping point resulting in any of the major protests, but this general disaffected attitude 
did reflect a source of discontent specific to the youth movements (Bakhtadze, 2002). The 
university as a site of contestation is especially salient, given the growth of students in all 
three countries leading up to their respective electoral revolution. 
Just in Ukraine, for example, the "share of students between the ages of fifteen to 
twenty-four increased from 21 to 32 percent in the last decade" (Nikolayenko, 2007: 
171). Similar growth existed in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, as illustrated below. For these 
countries, the rise in attendance amounted to an incomparable growth of higher learning, 
and also reflected a physical location where young people could gather, network, and 
engage in political action when needed. 
Table 5.1 Georgia Tertiary Education Levels 
GER% 1991 1999 
(Gross Enrollment 
Ratios) Total Students -- 36 
Males -- 35 
Females -- 37 









Table 5.2 Ukraine Tertiary Education Levels 
GER% 1991 1999 
(Gross Enrollment 
Ratios) Total Students -- 47 
Males -- 44 
Females -- 50 
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Retrieved from 
http://stats. uis. unesco.org/unesco 
Table 5.3 Kyrgyzstan Tertiary Education Levels 
GER% 1991 1999 
(Gross Enrollment 
Ratios) Total Students -- 29 
Males -- 28 
Females -- 30 



















education at the same time their youth movements were strongly mobilizing. The data for 
Georgia, however, are interesting and unique. Of the three countries assessed, only 
Georgia experienced a decline in gross enrollment ratios (GER %) of its tertiary 
education levels. It is beyond the scope of my research to suggest causes in this decline, 
but for this project, it is still telling that the growth that Georgian universities did 
experience was between the years of 1999 and 2002, when its Kmara youth organization 
was on the rise, expanding and organizing. As the last two tables show, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan experienced similar growth patterns as Georgia, but did not encounter a 
decline after the electoral revolutions. The larger enrollment figures for these two 
countries also coincide with the youth movement growth and electoral revolution 
involvement of Pora and KelKel. In summary, the post-Soviet generation in these three 
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countries entered into higher education at regionally-impressive numbers around the 
times of their great political upheaval in the early-to-mid 2000s. This comparison does 
not suggest that the growth in education actually resulted in the youth movements but 
rather, that higher education acted both as an important physical networking site as well 
as a site for contestation and reform, given the larger enrollment numbers and their self-
interest in educational politics. These two features aided in bonding the young 
populations together as well as contributing to the formation of a political generation with 
common tactics, goals, and physical networking sites. 
Nationalism and Ethnic Makeup 
In addition to greater enrollment ratios of higher education, the post-Soviet youth 
can be characterized by another aspect that differs markedly from the older generations in 
their nation-states. This characteristic deals directly with their relationship to the Soviet 
Union, nationalism and their coming-to-age in a newly independent state. I have 
previously suggested that the carte blanche background for the youths in the recently 
formed, once-satellite nations was formative of a political generation. This section 
examines that assertion in greater depth. 
In particular, scholars have addressed the long-term effects of "Russification," in 
both language and custorri requirements for non-ethnically Russian individuals during 
Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union (Way, 2008; Nikolayenko, 2007). Nikolayenko 
continues on to assess its importance in regard to a formation of a new political 
generation and writes that "decades of Russijication, an official Soviet policy aimed at 
imposing the domination of Russian culture throughout the multiethnic Soviet Union, left 
deep scars in the social fabric of former Soviet republic" (2007: 177). This policy had 
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many implications for nationalism and CIS-studies, but for the purpose of this section, it 
is important to note that it resulted in yet another difference between their parents' 
generation and the youth of today. 
F or example, once being liberated from a policy of foreign origins, the search for 
a national identity for Georgians, Ukrainians and Kyrgyzstanis was once again at the 
surface and of import during this critical juncture. Now blessed with statehood, young 
people were then simultaneously tasked and privileged to revive their own languages, 
folk heroes, and national culture more broadly. Whereas the previously mandated policy 
of Russification imposed language and cultural standards on a diverse ethnic culture in all 
three countries covered, this new development allowed young people the freedom to fmd 
or remake their nation and national-identity according to their own interests. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, or the earlier years of the USSR's nationalities reforms, 
the focus was on a policy of korenizatisya or "indigenization." These reforms were more 
multi ethnic or multinational in nature and accepting of differing groups. By the later 
1930s and entering into difficult wartime efforts, Russification was more fully in effect, 
with Russian language classes as a requirement (Way, 2008). These policies waxed and 
waned during the duration of the Soviet Union, but a notion of hierarchy, with the 
Russian-language and ethnically-Russian individuals at the top, was as reoccurring theme 
throughout (Brubacker, 1994). 
This history is important given the actual ethnic diversity of Georgia, Ukraine, 
and Kyrgyzstan. These influences, taken together, have undoubtedly impacted the post-
Soviet generation's attempts to differentiate themselves from a foreign past and forge a 
new, national culture of which they can take ownership. Additionally, growing up in an 
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environment with the freedom of language-choice and national identity fostered a strong 
identification with the nation-state. Although not all is peaceful and even the countries in 
question have experienced painful and ongoing ethnic tensions, the Kmara, Pora and 
KelKel youth movements emerged with an interest to set themselves apart from the 
historical and overarching Soviet identity. In doing so, too, these movements and the 
youth more generally were decidedly more Western-leaning, both in terms of movement 
allies but also in terms of democratic or market goals. 
In order to better understand this point, it is useful to look toward the actual ethnic 
makeup of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. The tables and qualitative assessments 
below indicate the ethnic make-up, challenges to civil society and further implications for 
long-term effects of the Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolutions. 
Table 5.4 Ethnic Make-up of Georgia 





Ossetians < 1.0% 
Yezids < 1.0% 
Greeks < 1.0% 
Kists < 1.0% 
Ukrainians < 1.0% 
Abkhazians < 1.0% 
Source: Georgia, the People of Georgia Report. Retrieved from 
http://www.una.ge/pdfs/publications/survey report eng.pdf 
The table above reflects the ethnic makeup and divisions within Georgia. Although 
Georgians are the clear majority in terms of percentage, accompanying qualitative 
research on the history of Georgia suggests that there exists a view that "Georgians 
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themselves are not homogenous and can be further divided into groups" (Hunter, 1994). 
Therefore, aside from the obvious variations in ethnic dimensions, such as the 
Abkhazians, the Ossets, Armenians or Azerbaijanis, there are divisions in the dominant 
ethnic group as well. This fact suggests, not only a sheer multiplicity of ethnic minorities, 
but that they are often obscured, even in dominant discourse. It goes on to imply that 
Georgians themselves "cannot be regarded as ethnically cohesive and are subject to 
internal divisions" (Hunte, 1994). With the aforementioned poverty level, we find that 
these ethnic cleavages are further aggravated by the harshness of the economic 
conditions, ultimately, contributing to vulnerability in statehood in terms of both 
domestic and outsider threats. 
The removal of an overarching Soviet policy on ethnic identity led to changes of 
Georgia's approach to ethnic minorities in two major ways. First, in asserting sovereignty, 
the newly formed state of Georgia was able to proudly display the majority ethnic group 
Georgian, despite its otherwise multifaceted composition. Secondly, however, the 
disappearance of supranational governance in the form of the Soviet Union left a power 
vacuum in which ethnic divisions and once-silenced or less powerful groups could assert 
their standing, even if that erupted in the atmosphere of ethnically-motivated violence 
and hostilities. As such, it has been these divisions that have plagued the civil society of 
Georgia and as discussed later on, hindered youth movement success following the 
opening up after the Rose Revolution. 
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Table 5.5 Ethnic Make-up of Ukraine 











Source: Background Note - Ukraine. Retrieved from 
http://www.state.gov/r/paieiibgnl3211.htm 
Ukraine's ethnic reality is relatively diverse but statistically less complicated than 
that of Georgia and is characterized by a dichotomy between Ukrainians and Russians, 
both ethnically and linguistically. As one might expect, given Ukraine's defining 
characteristic as a borderlands between East and West, or Europe and Russia, the ethnic 
makeup of Ukraine is strongly Ukrainian but with a sizable Russian minority. Unlike 
Georgia, Ukraine's prominent internal divisions generally do not stem from ethnic groups 
or ethnic violence. Rather, the dividing line in Ukraine straddles Eastern and Western 
Ukraine. Nationalism and, likewise, the Orange electorate hold a more prominent 
position in Western Ukraine. Meanwhile, Yanukovych, the bulk of his supporters and the 
decidedly more pro-Russian electorate finds its home in the Eastern region of the country. 
These divisions are not a new symptom after Ukraine's 1991 independence. They 
have fomented under the surface, sometimes boiling over into nationalist violence, during 
many times prior to 1991 and even prior to the existence of the Soviet Union itself. In a 
NATO document describing the country, NATO fellow Khrychikov writes: 
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For the sake of convenience, it will be expedient only to make a point that 
regional polarisation of Ukraine and pro-Russian sentiments in the Eastern 
parts may be considered as historically rooted and been developed 
throughout centuries of being exposed to influxes coming from 
neighbours. Eastern Ukraine has had a long period of being part of first 
Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union, whereas most of Western 
Ukraine joined the USSR only after the 
Second World War (2000: 7) 
Clearly, given this distinction, the challenges to civil society and the long-term 
democratic growth instilled by the Orange Revolution will be played out between pro-
Russian or nationalist proponents. This was articulated in Chapter 4, as illustrated 
through the actions ofYanukovych in choosing his administrative and cabinet members, 
and it is also echoed in political sentiments of the youth movements during the electoral 
revolution. The youth in Pora! set out to distance themselves from its Soviet past and in 
doing so, embraced the Orange and nationalist rhetoric of Western, or more urbanized 
Ukraine. As has been characteristic of Ukrainian history, the long-term influences of this 
political generation seem to be played out again and again in the dichotomous choice of 
East or West. Although this has proven much more manageable and less violent than 
ethnic divisions in Georgia, for example, this either/or distinction still acts as a barrier to 
liberalizing change for the weakening democratic leader in the region. 









Source: Kyrgyzstan: Delicate Ethnic Balance. Retrieved from 
http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=89526 
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The population of Kyrgyzstan differs from the other two case studies in that it is 
comprised of three main ethnic groups: Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Russians. Similar to others 
in Central Asia, this rich mix of ethnic groups can be traced back to the somewhat 
haphazard drawing of borders by Stalin the 1920s. However, after the end of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, the balance of ethnic groups changed somewhat dramatically. The ethnic 
Russian population has sharply declined, particularly in the southern part of the country. 
As indicated by the title of the news article, "Kyrgyzstan: Delicate Ethnic Balance" 
(2010, June 17), this removal of the ethnic Russian minority, accompanied by internal 
migration, has greatly altered the fragile balance between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The dual 
challenge of state and democracy-building in this strongly multi-ethnic society has 
proven difficult, even after the initial attempts of the Tulip Revolution. 
Having laid the groundwork for the generation from which these movements 
emerged and the particularities of their nation-states, it is now possible to more 
adequately and accurately assess their full involvement in the Color Revolutions. 
Comparison of Political Opportunities and Modular Political Action 
Apropos to this section, it is interesting to consult yet another Russian proverb 
which asserts povtoreniye - mat' ucheniya or "repetition is the mother of learning." This 
somewhat familiar - practice makes perfect - adage is useful in assessing the dispersive 
and iterated actions employed by youth movements in the region. Specifically, when 
looking to the mobilizing events, training and protest tactics, there exists a great amount 
of overlap and shared characteristics between the three case studies. All three were 
inspired by the Serbian factor, Otpor, in one way or another and, of course, all three were 
responding to fraudulent electoral results on behalf of an incumbent government. As the 
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following section will illustrate, the cases chosen exhibit extensive shared characteristics; 
however, there also exists a great deal of uniqueness, given the specificities of their 
nation-state and inimitable circumstances. 
Kmara in Georgia ~ Rose Revolution 
Whereas Serbia benefited from the organized and unconventional protests of 
Otpor in the Bulldozer Revolution, Georgia's Rose Revolution was aided by the work of 
the strong youth movement branded as Kmara or "Enough." Prior to the major protests in 
the wake of the 2003 elections, Georgian students began to organize as early as 2000 to 
raise awareness of what they perceived as unmitigated corruption at state universities. 
These initial efforts were relatively small, comprised of approximately 2,500 students, 
and began at Tbilisi State University before branching out to other universities and 
smaller locales across the country. 
Before the mobilizing events in 2003, these smaller organizations concentrated on 
state corruption within the national universities, such as the hiring or promotion practices 
among the state-ruled administrations. This early activism paled in comparison to the 
national-level electoral reform sparked by the Rose Revolution, but the smaller groups 
did achieve relative successes. For example, beginning at Tbilisi State University, 
students created the first student government at a state university, a new criterion that was 
then emulated at other schools in Georgia as efforts to implement educational reform and 
reduce state-sanctioned corruption (Bakhtadze, 2002). What is more notable for the 
purposes of this analysis, however, is that these nascent student groups would later evolve 
into the much larger and more effective Kmara youth movement. 
Clearly, the Georgian youth movement was at its height during the Rose 
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Revolution of November 2003, but Kmara itself seems to have formed as early as 
February 2003 (van der Schriek, 2003). It was at this point that the existing loose network 
of student organizations coalesced to form the highly connected organization, operating 
under the single banner of Kmara. Here, Tarrow's work on political opportunity 
frameworks as well as Beissinger's account of modular political action come together 
nicely to support an explanation of Kmara's calculated formation. 
This change from informal to formal was the result of not only mobilizing events 
related to the upcoming parliamentary elections and dissatisfaction with then-president 
Shevardadnze, but it was also accompanied by the diffusive training efforts on behalf of 
Otpor and funding from pro-democratic sources with deep pockets. By partnering with 
the Georgian Human Rights NGO, Liberty Institute, and increasing contact with activists 
from Otpor, the student movements greatly increased their networking and organization-
building capacities (McFaul, 2005). Before November 2003, some of these newly-minted 
Kmara activists also received training at Belgrade's Center for Nonviolent Resistance, 
which had been instrumental in the earlier Serbian youth movement. Taking a page out of 
the Otpor and a Gene Sharp-inspired playbook regarding nonviolent resistance, the young 
activists modeled their organization to form a decentralized network ofleadership.6 
Kmara's numbers grew during this brief build-up in 2003; meanwhile, organizers 
consciously maintained a leadership style that was loose, unaffiliated with a "head office" 
and made up of regional cells. This geographic and managerial diversity hearkened to the 
grassroots-style activism the group desired, but it also provided much-needed autonomy 
and self-sufficiency. 
6 See Appendix C for an excerpt from Gene Sharp and the Albert Einstein Institute's work on nonviolent 
resistance tactics for comparison. 
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In other words, without a head office or strict hierarchical leadership, the 
dismantling of the organization would prove difficult, if not impossible, for the political 
elites in power. Instead, Kmara members were considered to be sovereign leaders within 
their regional bases. Their initial training included political marketing, media relations, 
recruitment and debating skills and moreover, lessons on how to stage a "bloodless 
revolution" ala Gene Sharp and his nonviolent tactics (van der Schreik, 2003). Western 
NGOs, particularly Soros' Open Society Institute, aided in providing the much-needed 
funds for trainings and trips between Serbia and Georgia. This early stage, initially led by 
members of Otpor and receiving aid from Western pro-democratic groups -such as the 
aforementioned Soros' Open Society Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy, 
and Council of Europe among others-provided Kmara youth advocates with a toolkit for 
democratic activism that could then be supplanted and shared with their respective cities 
and broader regional networks (Herd, 2005). Given this diffusion and transferability, 
Kmara followed a similar path as Otpor: it quickly went from a Western-aided 
organization with cross-national ties to a movement that was shared with the Georgian 
people themselves and would further help them realize democratic efforts on a national 
scale. 
This type of youth movement, distinctive with millennial political and marketing 
savvy, was unprecedented in Georgia. By the way of its structure, Kmara began by 
focusing singularly on regional issues, but in the short lead-up to the November elections, 
they started to concentrate largely on electoral reform. Here, they utilized nonviolent 
protest tactics such as graffiti (of their clenched fist logo-the same as Otpor's except for 
the Kmara wording at the bottom of the image), and noisy protest marches, also similar to 
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Otpor's stylistic protest tactics (Herd, 2005; Nikolayenko, 2006). These were cheap but 
effective measures in that they greatly improved the visibility of the youth movement and 
its increasingly national motives. Soon thereafter, Kmara was a "broadly recognizable 
name" in Georgia, with members making appearances on news channels and in major 
newspapers, such as the Tbilisi-based national news source, Georgian Times (van der 
Schriek, 2003). As the November elections grew closer, the group acted in tandem with 
the aforementioned Liberty Institute to organize and train election observers that would 
ensure free and fair procedures on the voting day. Kmara, unlike the opposition parties or 
the more traditional civil society organizations, was of acute importance at this juncture. 
It was here that they were able to tap into their informal, albeit extremely powerful, 
student networks for recruitment. 
Kmara, with the aid of Otpor, further mobilized this sector by working with 
Rustavi-2, a private broadcast network, to air a documentary on the Bulldozer Revolution 
and the toppling of Milosevic twice before the November elections. The general secretary 
of Georgia's National Movement opposition party, Ivane Merabishvili, told reporters 
immediately following the Rose Revolution that, 
Most important was the film. All the demonstrators knew the tactics of the 
revolution in Belgrade by heart because [Rustavi-2] showed ... the film on 
their revolution. Everyone knew what to do. This was a copy of that 
revolution 
(quoted in van der Schreik, 2003). 
Once irregularities were reported on voting day, November 2,2003, Kmara youth 
activists led the protests in Tbilisi and other major Georgian cities. They staged protests 
for twenty days until Saakashvili and his allies famously entered the legislative hall to 
present the fraudulent leader with roses and signify the end of the Shevardnadze reign. 
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At this point, Kmara was a comparatively recent addition-less than a year old--in 
the landscape of Georgian politics. Nonetheless, they managed to guide the opposition 
protests with careful and quick leadership. McFaul writes, "Kmara was new, and so had 
not paved the way for protest as Otpor had, but once the vote was stolen, Kmara played a 
more central role than had its Serbian counterpart in mobilizing street protests" (2005: 
12). Therefore, as the Rose Revolution was played out with a combination of political 
parties and civic organizations, Kmara was the sought-after and required driving force in 
the actual street protests that were instrumental for the end of the Shevardnadze regime. 
As such, the organization gained a great deal from Otpor's training and, of course, 
Western aid; yet it played an essential role in its decidedly unique circumstances. 
As for Kmara currently, my findings suggest that many of the regional leaders and 
trainers left the organization to work for the Liberty Institute while many of its other 
activists just simply left. An internet search for "Kmara" reveals that, other than the 
references to 2003, Kmara has all but disappeared. This point is particularly salient, given 
that more recent democratic protests (Moldova'S "Twitter Revolution", Iran's Green 
Revolution, and current events of the so-called 2011 Arab Spring) have spurred a great 
amount of interest in the use of Twitter, Facebook and online communications. Kmara's 
recent absence in news and social networking indicates that while they were instrumental 
in the actual protests, their relative short existence in the Georgian civil sphere may have 
hindered their long-term effectiveness. Additionally, Kmara's shortcomings and lack of 
involvement after the flurry of 2003 's events suggests that outlying factors, such as 
Georgia's economic, ethnic and security hardships in its present-day politics may playa 
much larger role, reducing the usefulness of a pro-democratic youth movement. This 
77 
differs markedly from Ukraine's Pora! youth organization, which will be discussed next. 
Pora! in Ukraine's Orange Revolution 
nOPA! is translated to "It's time!" in Ukrainian. This simple, yet effective, 
branding characterized the irritation and urgency of the youth movement during the 2004 
Orange Revolution. Like Kmara, Pora! received training and benefited from the overall 
iterated efforts of Serbia's Otpor. With this training and by working in tandem with the 
Our Ukraine party coalition, Pora! incited and nurtured the three weeks of protest in the 
dead of the 2004-2005 Ukrainian winter. Though this research questions the dichotomous 
success or failure paradigm, and Chapter 4 has illustrated present instabilities for 
Ukraine's democratic growth, when it comes to sheer size and imagery, Pora! was 
undoubtedly the most effective and memorable of the three youth movements assessed. 
Interestingly, too, the movement has grown to be a permanent fixture in Ukrainian civil 
society -as a political party (Yellow Pora!) and independent civil organization (Black 
Pora!), which will be discussed later on in this section. 
Pora! 's evolution is strikingly similar to Kmara's, given the growth in education, 
related student groups and cross-national training from Serbia's Otpor. Members ofPora! 
even travelled to Tbilisi to witness their protests and learn from their tactics during the 
Rose Revolution (Wilson, 2006). So, too, was Pora! largely influenced by Otpor's 
adoption of Gene Sharp's nonviolent tactics in From Dictatorship to Democracy. Unlike 
Kmara and the upcoming Kyrgyzstani KelKel youth movement, however, Pora! was 
extremely effective in adopting these policies and becoming a fixture in the Ukrainian 
civil society. Part of the explanation for its increased visibility is simply related to their 
political and marketing know-how. Pora! and the Orange Revolution itself were visibly 
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sensational- from creative sloganeering to the sheer size of the protests. These images 
contributed to a media-fueled event that drew attention to the youth movement's 
existence while raising awareness for their goals. 
The exchange of roses in the Rose Revolution was a memorable highlight and yet, 
it paled in comparison to the images generated by the flood of people wearing orange in 
Kyiv's Independence Square and the specific, propagandistic images generated by PoraL 
The protestors in the square and around Ukraine were from the society at-large, but their 
efforts were mobilized and bolstered by the vibrant youth movement and persistence on 
behalf of Pora! leading up to the street events. Like Kmara, this group used cheap but 
effective means to spread the word about their causes (often simply anti-Kuchma) and to 
raise awareness more generally. 
Utilizing graffiti and street art, such as wheat pasting and stenciling, Pora! 
expressed their slogans and splashed their logos across Ukrainian cityscapes. With this 
propensity toward the radical, they did not mince words nor censor themselves. These 
confrontational tactics were illustrated in one Pora! poster in which a boot is crushing a 
cockroach (signifying then-president Kuchma) and in graffiti reading "Kuchma = Bandit" 
(Wilson, 2006). Perhaps, most clearly and effectively, one Pora! poster suggested that the 
fraudulent takeover of Kyiv by Donetsk, where the incumbently-selected Yanukovych 
calls home, would be equivalent to the Nazi takeover of Kyiv during World War II 
(Kuzio, 2010a: 66). This quite radical approach beckoned to everyday Ukrainians and 
suggested, as Taras Kuzio (201Oa) has put it: "as Ukrainians had then defeated that 
attempt, Pora stated that they would also defeat this attempt on this occasion" (66). The 
threat of a Donetsk "takeover" was a common theme in the protests of the Orange 
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Revolution and were strongly enunciated by Pora!, both in the aforementioned poster but 
in their involvement with rock concerts and the promotion of protest music to the 
younger generations. For a generation growing up with greater exposure to not only 
Western ideas of liberalism, but also Western forms of entertainment, music tapped into 
an under-utilized source of discontent and anger with the KuchmalYanukovych regime. 
Kuzio, in his assessment (:)f the music writes: 
Songs such as Ukraina by the well-known band Mandry called upon 
Ukrainians to look at their ancestors, who were looking down upon them 
at this critical time. The option of staying passive was morally wrong 
because too many Ukrainian intellectuals had already suffered and died. 
The insinuation was that with the election of Yanukovych, their Ukraine, 
from a nationally conscious point of view, would be irrevocably lost. 
Orange Revolution music called upon Ukrainians to rush to Kyiv to defend 
this sacred city from a Yanukovych victory. Everyone should travel to 
Kyiv as soon as they could, by any means possible and, if no 
other way was available, on foot (2010a: 66). 
This careful blending between a commitment to Ukrainian history and a duty to aid in 
fulfilling its promising future was amplified through song, rock music, and street theatrics 
- including graffiti. It was not singularly proposed or enunciated by Pora!, but they were 
effective in aligning the increasingly educated and Western-leaning Ukrainian youth with 
their pro-democratic ideals and protests. 
While these acts were similar and shared between the other movements studied, 
secondary sources and the continued existence of Pora! suggests that the youth movement 
was most effective in Ukraine. Pora! today has divided but remains important to the 
Ukrainian civil society. One arm, Black Pora!, still acts as an independent youth civic 
organization whereas its counterpart, Yellow Pora!, has been institutionalized as a 
political party. Although it has not exactly flourished, it is still in existence and won seats 
in a recent election for L'viv City Council in Western Ukraine. This indicates that the 
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youth movement and the vision it instilled has not completely disappeared from 
Ukrainian civil society despite troubling national-level outcomes (Pravda, Nov. 8,2010). 
KelKel in Kyrgyzstan ~ Tulip Revolution 
KeiKel, the youth movement involved in the Tulip Revolution, takes its name 
from the Kyrgyz language meaning "renaissance" and "shining of the good." Similar to 
the organizations discussed thus far, KeiKel, with its eager moniker, acted as a pro-
democratic and youthful source within the civil society while the country as a whole 
underwent electoral reforms. So, too, like the other organizations discussed, did the 
movement access leadership training and tactics from Otpor, Kmara, Pora and support 
from Western democracy NGOs, such as Soros' Open Society Institute. However, stark 
differences do exist for KelKel and its overall effectiveness. While Pora encountered 
difficulties but found an ostensibly permanent home in the fabric of Ukrainian civil 
society and Kmara largely disbanded but still acted as a prominent mobilizing force, 
KelKel faced unique challenges that undermined its overall efficacy both during and after 
the Tulip Revolution. 
One early challenge that has been touched upon but is important to reconsider is 
simply the geographic nature of Kyrgyzstan. Steven Hess (2010) wrote in a recent article 
that "Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan are relatively isolated from the West in terms of 
economic, political, and social linkages and geography as compared to the Baltic and 
East European states;" in which these latter post-Soviet states have endured greater 
democratic growth and been more easily welcomed into the broader European culture and 
society (29). He continues the comparison, noting that "although within this group, 
Ukraine is clearly the most closely connected and Kyrgyzstan the least" (Hess, 2010: 29). 
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Due to these geographic realities, KelKel was befallen with an acute challenge, not 
experienced by Kmara or Pora in the prior years of democratic revolution. Despite 
attempts of diffusion and modulated political action of nonviolence resistance for yet 
another "bloodless [democratic] revolution," the efforts by Western pro-democracy 
groups and similarly aligned movements like Otpor simply did not gain the same traction 
as they did in Georgia or Ukraine. 
This incomplete diffusion was not for lack of trying. The Kyrgyz citizenry clearly 
received many of the same mechanisms for democracy promotion that have already been 
assessed for the other groups. Hess, too, stresses this point and writes, 
Outside donors, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, Eurasia 
Foundation, U.S. State Department, and USAID sponsored more than 170 
nonprofit organizations in Kyrgyzstan aimed at supporting democracy ... 
They funded an independent printing press in Bishkek and Radio Azattyk, 
a Kyrgyz affiliate of Radio Free Europe, and even transported a group of 
Kyrgyz youth to Ukraine to observe and learn from the Orange Revolution 
(2010: 29-30, emphasis added). 
Whereas similar activities contributed to the establishment of a cohesive youth movement 
in Georgia and Ukraine, KelKel never fully coalesced into a strong oppositional 
movement. Without wholly denigrating the student movement that did exist in 
Kyrgyzstan, it is important to consider factors that led to these troubles or inefficiencies. 
Clearly diffusion, economic support and modular political action are not the only factors 
that playa role in a movement's strength and formation. The specificities of Kyrgyzstan 
and its 2005 mobilizing election are additional indicators as to why KelKel did not 
achieve parallel traction, in comparison to the others studied. 
In addition to the geographic isolation of Kyrgyzstan, the country also differs in 
that the Tulip Revolution was played out as a more rural event when compared to 
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Ukraine and Georgia's city-focused protest activities. Kyrgyzstan has a much higher rural 
population (64%), in comparison to Ukraine's relatively more urbanized population at 
32% and even to Georgia's less urban 47% (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2005). 
Additionally, too, whereas the Rose and Orange Revolutions found strongholds in the 
capital cities of Tbilisi and Kyiv, Kyrgyzstan's protests began in the south of the country 
in lalal-Abad and Osh. Rather than accessing a well-connected student movement and 
acting in tandem with oppositional parties, the build-up to the Tulip Revolution found its 
greatest support in the form of "informal regional patronage networks and subnational 
cleavages" (Hess, 2010: 31). Here, regional elites from the south drew upon the strong 
division between the equally populous northern and southern regions of Kyrgyzstan, 
which are divided ethnically and politically and further isolated by a mountain range. As 
such, the fraudulent election was not an especially effective mobilizing event, as it had 
been for Kmara and Pora. Hess writes, "While the announcement by international 
election observers than the election had been rigged was not entirely ineffectual, its main 
importance in motivating popular outrage was related to its exacerbation of existing 
regionally based grievances" (2010: 33). This suggests that rather than being driven by a 
unified grassroots opposition, the Tulip Revolution was mostly led by political elites and 
an ad hoc, regional opposition originating in the south of the country. 
Their main interests, therefore, may not have been for reform and civil resistance, 
as was a major driving force in the other youth movements. Instead, it arguably 
represents a "window of opportunity presented by a flawed election to temporarily 
channel regional grievances into a national opposition" (Hess, 2010: 33). KelKel was 
both unable to establish a firm foundation before the build-up to the events, but it also 
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was overshadowed by reinforcing cleavages and the political elites who represented 
them. This should not be misconstrued to suggest that KelKel was altogether ineffectual, 
but when compared to the other Color Revolutions in my research, they present a more 
fragmented and less autonomous civil society group. This argument is further evidenced 
by the utter disappearance of KelKel from any recent accessible public records or internet 
searches. Whereas Kmara disintegrating to some extent and members found homes in 
more established NGOs and Pora achieved relative success through its acceptance into 
the greater civil society, nowhere was I able to find information on KelKel and its 
significance after the Tulip Revolution. Despite iterated attempts, through the additional 
adoption of the clenched fist logo we have grown accustomed to, a "free" voice on the 
airwaves, or extensive Western aid, KelKel's future seems bleak, if not utterly non-
existent. 
Summary 
While the generational advantage of being able to form a new identity allowed 
young people in the post-Soviet sphere to initiate and organize protests, the long-term 
changes and influences of these movements are more multifaceted and influenced by 
factors such as education, poverty levels, the extent of diffusion and regional or ethnic 
hostilities. Nonetheless, it remains true that the young people in all three cases were able 
to organize protest activities, which later on, galvanized larger portions of their nations' 
citizenries and questioned the corrupt and fraudulent elections that had previously existed 
as a status quo. These groups undoubtedly impacted the political atmosphere and civil 
society in their newly developed home countries. Their success rates and long-term 
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influences may vary, but they should not be overlooked or relegated to the margins of 




The underlying interest in pursuing this study was to challenge a success or failure 
paradigm, as it relates to both the post-Soviet electoral revolutions and democratization 
studies more broadly. In the aggregate regional level of this study, the presence of an 
electoral revolution was shown to have varying and, at times, insignificant relationships 
in respect to the chosen democratic variables. To supplement these findings, I employed a 
more detailed comparison of three electoral revolutions in the post-Soviet sphere. This 
step led to a more robust explanation of the differences and similarities for oppositional 
parties, state apparatus structures and, finally, protesting youth movements in the Rose, 
Orange and Tulip Revolutions. 
METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
One of the major difficulties in assessing the Color Revolutions is drawing 
boundary lines among party influence, NGOs and the smaller social movements while 
relying on secondary sources. As my research noted, the youth movements found 
considerable support from well-funded Western NGOs and organizations interested in 
spreading democracy for philanthropic or strategic purposes. Critics of the Color 
Revolutions have pointed to this factor as a delegitimizing force, indicating that the youth 
movements were insincere or invalid. Given these critiques and vociferous objections, 
there is a vast amount of disinformation that is difficult to wade through. While some of it 
stems from incumbent governments' attempts to dissuade followers, a great deal comes 
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from critics more broadly - those who oppose Soros' Open Society Institute and similar 
foundational sources. For the purposes of this research, I have noted funding sources 
where appropriate and tried to disengage my work from the broader and, at times, 
specious critiques. Moreover, as I think my analyses of the youth movements indicate, 
external aid, even when extremely generous, does not necessarily translate into successful 
democratic change. 
An additional shortfall related to my use of secondary sources is that, as with 
many social movements, they often fester under the surface before emerging into the 
mainstream. I argue that this is becoming less and less of a problem, due to the use of 
internet networking sites and blogging, but it is possible that the next KelKel or Kmara is 
currently forming and intensifying at local universities. Being geographically isolated 
from these likely budding reformers makes the research less precise and predictive. 
Nonetheless, I have attempted to control for this limitation through extensive internet 
searches and scouring easily accessible online sources that exist outside of major 
newspapers and scholarly journals. These findings reaffirm my conclusions on the 
respective youth movements, but it is important to keep this limitation in mind when 
making overall evaluations. 
AREAS OF FUTURE STUDY 
For a more robust comparison of electoral revolutions in the future, I would like 
to include cases from outside of the CIS. This regional focus has helped in creating a 
more manageable research project, but it has also reduced the scope and generalizability 
of my work. For example, recent changes in the Middle East and North Africa have 
highlighted the need for detailed, comparative work covering both democratic revolutions 
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and the extent of youth movement involvement. It would also be illuminating to evaluate 
electoral revolutions over time, outside of the CIS and ranging over a period longer than 
the early-to-mid 2000s. Another common critique of the Color Revolutions is that, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, they are not revolutions at all but simply a changing from one 
elite group to a newer, younger elite group. This critique could be more easily challenged 
through a cross-regional and cross-time analysis. 
Additionally, the choice to concentrate on youth movements was made in an effort 
to better understand a single manageable, albeit important sector of the countries' civil 
societies. In the future, my research would benefit from evaluating other parts of this 
important and changing factor related to democracy. For example, Ukraine has an 
increasingly significant NGO sector concentrating on women's rights. These 
organizations encompass legal rights organizations associated with political parties on 
one hand, and radical organizations like FEMEN on the other. The latter groups embrace 
nonviolent but relatively extreme tactics to raise awareness about predominantly 
women's issues, such as sexual trafficking in the CIS, through the adoption of nude and 
confrontational protests in Kyiv's Independence Square. It is unclear, however, what role 
these groups, the more mainstream as well as the radical, have played in pro-democratic 
reform or how they are received in the broader civil society. And even though my 
analysis reflects generally upon Kmara, Pora!, and KelKel's future, it would be 
interesting and beneficial to better understand their interplay with NGOs or other social 
movements in their respective countries. 
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OVERVIEW 
Despite these shortfalls and areas in need of expansion, this research has 
examined recent electoral revolutions in the post-Soviet sphere while challenging the 
success or failure paradigm that dominates democratic transition literature. In order to 
cast a wider net while maintaining a parsimonious project, I employed a two-part 
analysis. First, the aggregate-level of my research looked at five variables related to 
democratic growth and well-being. Taken from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(BTl) from 2006-2010, the cross-tabulations between presence of electoral revolutions 
and the chosen democratic variables revealed variability in the region as a whole. 
Contrary to what I initially expected, the presence of an electoral revolution did not 
strongly relate to higher levels of democracy in the chosen variables. 
F or a better understanding beyond this aggregated approach, the next level of my 
research employed a qualitative comparison of Georgia'S Rose Revolution (2003), 
Ukraine's Orange Revolution (2004), and Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution (2005). The 
first section evaluated variables, such as oppositional party strength and the state coercive 
apparatus. The findings in this section further supported the argument to resist a success 
or failure approach and indicated that, even Ukraine, which is considered the strong 
leader in the region and a "success" by scholars, has encountered reversals and challenges 
to its 2004 pro-democratic reform. 
To better understand this variability, my final analysis in Chapter 5 focused on the 
youth movements, a commonly misunderstood or neglected part of the electoral 
revolutions in the CIS. These findings support the claim that a stronger civil society is 
more likely to experience longer-lasting reform, although additional factors such as state 
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security and ethnic hostilities playa large role in the cases chosen. Moreover, while the 
successes of the youth movements vary, they should be considered as an important and 
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Variables and Categorical Recoding for BTl Rankings 
Independent Variables 
Electoral Revolution * Level of Stateness Crosstabulation 




Weak Strong Total 
Electoral No (0) 0 3 2 0 5 
Revolution? Yes (1) 1 1 4 1 7 
Total 1 4 6 1 12 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index. (2010). Status Index [Data file]. 
Retrieved from http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/enlbti/. 
Range in 2010 Stateness Scores for CIS region: 6.3 to 9.0 
Recoded for relative, regional comparisons as: 
01. Very Weak: 6.0-6.9 
02. Weak: 7.0-7.9 
03. Strong:8.0-8.9 
04. Very Strong: 9.0-10.0 
Electoral Revolution * Level of Political Participation Crosstabulation 




Weak Strong Total 
Electoral No (0) 1 3 1 0 5 
Revolution? Yes (1) 0 3 1 3 7 
Total 1 6 2 3 12 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index. (2010). Status Index [Data file]. 
Retrieved from http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/enlbti/. 
Range in 2010 Political Participation Scores for CIS region: 1.3 to 7.8 
Recoded for relative, regional comparisons as: 
01. Very Weak: 0.0-1.9 
02. Weak: 2.0-3.9 
03. Strong: 4.0-5.9 
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04. Very Strong: 6.0-7.9 
Electoral Revolution * Level of "Rule of Law" Crosstabulation 




Weak Strong Total 
Electoral No (0) 3 2 0 0 5 
Revolution? Yes (1) 1 3 2 1 7 
Total 4 5 2 1 12 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index. (2010). Status Index [Data file]. 
Retrieved from http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/enlbti/. 
Range in 2010 Rule of Law Scores for CIS region: 2.3 to 6.3 
Recoded for relative, regional comparisons as: 
01. Very Weak: 2.0-3.5 
02. Weak: 3.6-4.5 
03. Strong: 4.6-5.5 
04. Very Strong: 5.6-6.5 
Electoral Revolution * Stability of Democratic Institutions 
Crosstabulation 





Weak Strong, Total 
Electoral No (0) 4 0 1 0 
Revolution? Yes (1) 4 0 0 3 




Source: Bertelsmann Stlftung TransformatIOn Index. (2010). Status Index [Data file]. 
Retrieved from http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/enlbti/. 
Range in 2010 Stability of Democratic Institution Scores for CIS region: 1.0 to 7.0 
Recoded for relative, regional comparisons as: 
01. Very Weak: 1.0-2.5 
02. Weak: 2.6-4.0 
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03. Strong: 4.1-5.5 
04. Very Strong: 5.6-7 
Electoral Revolution * Political & Social Integration Levels Crosstabulation 




Weak Strong Total 
Electoral No (0) 2 2 1 0 5 
Revolution? Yes (1) 0 1 3 3 7 
Total 2 3 4 3 12 
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index. (2010). Status Index [Data file]. 
Retrieved from http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/enlbti/ . 
Range in Political and Social Integration Scores for CIS region: 1.7 to 6.0 
Recoded for relative, regional comparisons as: 
01. Very Weak: 1.0-2.25 
02. Weak: 2.26-3.5 
03. Strong: 3.6-4.75 
04. Very Strong: 4.76-6.0 
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AppendixB 
Logo Usage across Otpor-inspired Youth Movements in the post-Soviet sphere 
Otpor - Serbia Kmara - Georgia 
IIOPA! 
Pora - Ukraine KelKel - Kyrgyzstan 




Nonviolent Tactics from Albert Einstein Institute 
While not all of these methods are used or addressed, they have become somewhat of a 
handbook or activists in authoritarian or hybrid regimes. The youth movements 
discussed, in their training by Otpor and Soros' Open Society Institute, undoubtedly drew 
inspiration from the tactics compiled below. The Albert Einstein Institute offers Professor 
Sharp's works online and the methods below, for example, are available in over 40 
different languages. 
THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT 
PROTEST AND PERSUASION 
Formal Statements 
1. Public Speeches 
2. Letters of opposition or support 
3. Declarations by organizations and 
institutions 
4. Signed public statements 
5. Declarations of indictment and 
intention 
6. Group or mass petitions 
Communications with a Wider 
Audience 
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols 
8. Banners, posters, and displayed 
communications 
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books 
10. Newspapers and journals 
11. Records, radio, and television 
12. Skywriting and earthwriting 
Group Representations 
13. Deputations 
14. Mock awards 
15. Group lobbying 
16. Picketing 
17. Mock elections 
Symbolic Public Acts 
18. Displays of flags and symbolic 
colors 
19. Wearing of symbols 
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20. Prayer and worship 
21. Delivering symbolic objects 
22. Protest disrobings 
23. Destruction of own property 
24. Symbolic lights 
25. Displays of portraits 
26. Paint as protest 
27. New signs and names 
28. Symbolic sounds 
29. Symbolic reclamations 
30. Rude gestures 
Pressures on Individuals 
31. "Haunting" officials 
32. Taunting officials 
33. Fraternization 
34. Vigils 
Drama and Music 
35. Humorous skits and pranks 





40. Religious processions 
41. Pilgrimages 
42. Motorcades 
Honoring the Dead 
43. Political mourning 
44. Mock funerals 
45. Demonstrative funerals 
46. Homage at burial places 
Public Assemblies 
47. Assemblies of protest or support 
48. Protest meetings 
49. Camouflaged meetings of protest 
50. Teach-ins 
Withdrawal and Renunciation 
51. Walk-outs 
52. Silence 
53. Renouncing honors 
54. Turning one's back 
THE METHODS OF SOCIAL 
NONCOOPERATION 
Ostracism of Persons 
55. Social boycott 
56. Selective social boycott 
57. Lysistratic nonaction 
58. Excommunication 
59. Interdict 
Noncooperation with Social Events, 
Customs, and Institutions 
60. Suspension of social and sports 
activities 
61. Boycott of social affairs 
62. Student strike 
63. Social disobedience 
64. Withdrawal from social institutions 
Withdrawal from the Social System 
65. Stay-at-home 
66. Total personal noncooperation 
67. "Flight" of workers 
68. Sanctuary 
69. Collective disappearance 
70. Protest emigration (hijrat) 
THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC 
NONCOOPERATION: (1) 
ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS 
Actions by Consumers 
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71. Consumers' boycott 
72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods 
73. Policy of austerity 
74. Rent withholding 
75. Refusal to rent 
76. National consumers' boycott 
77. International consumers' boycott 
Action by Workers and Producers 
78. Workmen's boycott 
79. Producers' boycott 
Action by Middlemen 
80. Suppliers' and handlers' boycott 
Action by Owners and Management 
81. Traders' boycott 
82. Refusal to let or sell property 
83. Lockout 
84. Refusal of industrial assistance 
85. Merchants' "general strike" 
Action by Holders of Financial 
Resources 
86. Withdrawal of bank deposits 
87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and 
assessments 
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest 
89. Severance of funds and credit 
90. Revenue refusal 
91. Refusal of a government's money 
Action by Governments 
92. Domestic embargo 
93. Blacklisting of traders 
94. International sellers' embargo 
95. International buyers' embargo 
96. International trade embargo 




97. Protest strike 
98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike) 
Agricultural Strikes 
99. Peasant strike 
100. Farm Workers' strike 
Strikes by Special Groups 
101. Refusal of impressed labor 
102. Prisoners' strike 
103. Craft strike 
104. Professional strike 
Ordinary Industrial Strikes 
105. Establishment strike 
106. Industry strike 
107. Sympathetic strike 
Restricted Strikes 
108. Detailed strike 
109. Bumper strike 
110. Slowdown strike 
111. Working-to-rule strike 
112. Reporting "sick" (sick-in) 
113. Strike by resignation 
114. Limited strike 
115. Selective strike 
Multi-Industry Strikes 
116. Generalized strike 
117. General strike 
Combination of Strikes and Economic 
Closures 
118. Hartal 
119. Economic shutdown 
THE METHODS OF POLITICAL 
NONCOOPERATION 
Rejection of Authority 
120. Withholding or withdrawal of 
allegiance 
121. Refusal of public support 
122. Literature and speeches advocating 
resistance 
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Citizens' Noncooperation with 
Government 
123. Boycott of legislative bodies 
124. Boycott of elections 
125. Boycott of government 
employment and positions 
126. Boycott of government depts., 
agencies, and other bodies 
127. Withdrawal from government 
educational institutions 
128. Boycott of government-supported 
organizations 
129. Refusal of assistance to 
enforcement agents 
130. Removal of own signs and 
placemarks 
131. Refusal to accept appointed 
officials 
132. Refusal to dissolve existing 
institutions 
Citizens' Alternatives to Obedience 
133. Reluctant and slow compliance 
134. Nonobedience in absence of direct 
supervision 
135. Popular nonobedience 
136. Disguised disobedience 
137. Refusal of an assemblage or 
meeting to disperse 
138. Sitdown 
139. Noncooperation with conscription 
and deportation 
140. Hiding, escape, and false identities 
141. Civil disobedience of "illegitimate" 
laws 
Action by Government Personnel 
142. Selective refusal of assistance by 
government aides 
143. Blocking of lines of command and 
information 
144. Stalling and obstruction 
145. General administrative 
noncooperation 
146. Judicial noncooperation 
147. Deliberate inefficiency and 
selective noncooperation by enforcement 
agents 
148. Mutiny 
Domestic Governmental Action 
149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays 
150. Noncooperation by constituent 
governmental units 
International Governmental Action 
151. Changes in diplomatic and other 
representations 
152. Delay and cancellation of 
diplomatic events 
153. Withholding of diplomatic 
recognition 
154. Severance of diplomatic relations 
155. Withdrawal from international 
organizations 
156. Refusal of membership in 
international bodies 
157. Expulsion from international 
organizations 
THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT 
INTERVENTION 
Psychological Intervention 
158. Self-exposure to the elements 
159. The fast 
a) Fast of moral pressure 
b) Hunger strike 
c) Satyagrahic fast 
160. Reverse trial 








168. Nonviolent raids 
169. Nonviolent air raids 
170. Nonviolent invasion 
171. Nonviolent interjection 
172. Nonviolent obstruction 
173. Nonviolent occupation 
Social Intervention 
174. Establishing new social patterns 
175. Overloading of facilities 
176. Stall-in 
177. Speak-in 
178. Guerrilla theater 
179. Alternative social institutions 
180. Alternative communication system 
Economic Intervention 
181. Reverse strike 
182. Stay-in strike 
183. Nonviolent land seizure 
184. Defiance of blockades 
185. Politically motivated counterfeiting 
186. Preclusive purchasing 
187. Seizure of assets 
188. Dumping 
189. Selective patronage 
190. Alternative markets 
191. Alternative transportation systems 
192. Alternative economic institutions 
Political Intervention 
193. Overloading of administrative 
systems 
194. Disclosing identities of secret 
agents 
195. Seeking imprisonment 
196. Civil disobedience of "neutral" laws 
197. Work-on without collaboration 
198. Dual sovereignty and parallel 
government 
Source: Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Vol. 2: The Methods of 
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